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INTRODUCTION
The latest round of the dispute between Malawi and Tanzania over
ownership of part of the northeastern stretches of Lake Malawi or Lake
Nyasa,1 which erupted in mid-2012, may have come as something of a sur-
prise to the international community.2 The casual observer must have
been puzzled by the spectacle of two apparently friendly neighboring
countries suddenly threatening to fall out due to contested sovereignty
over the lake. After all, their relations had improved considerably over the
two decades since the end of the 30-year single-party rule of former dicta-
tor Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda in Malawi in 1994.3 More puzzling still,
was the bellicose rhetoric that had not been heard since an earlier iteration
1. Throughout the colonial period the lake was known as Lake Nyasa. After its inde-
pendence from Great Britain on July 6, 1964, Malawi renamed it Lake Malawi pursuant to
the Alteration of Place Names Act, No. 2 of 1965. The Act was subsequently amended by the
Regional and District Boundaries and Place Names Act, No. 42 of 1967, Cap. 18:04: An Act
to provide for the division of Malawi into Regions and Districts and for alterations to such
divisions to provide for the conferring and altering of place names and for matters connected
therewith. The Act (Second Schedule, Item 1, First and Second Columns) reconfirms the
name change from Lake Nyasa to Lake Malawi. For full text of the Act, see Blackhall’s LAWS
OF MALAWI, REVISED LAWS VOL. III: REGIONAL AND DISTRICT BOUNDARIES AND PLACE
NAMES, www.malawilaws.com. As is commonly known, from all official maps and documents
published in Tanzania and public pronouncements by Tanzanian officials, Tanzania has never
accepted this name change and has maintained the name Lake Nyasa in the period since
1965. The lake is known as Lake Niassa in Mozambique. In this article, I generally use the
name Lake Malawi even when discussing events relating to the period prior to the name
change by Malawi. The appellation Lake Malawi is generally accepted and used by the rest of
the international community. However, I also occasionally use the name Lake Nyasa where
the context so requires.
2. The current standoff arose on July 30, 2012, when Tanzania asked Malawi to halt
oil and gas exploration activities in the lake until the dispute between the two countries
involving the lake boundary is resolved. Malawi rejected this demand and reasserted its claim
that the international boundary between the two countries runs along the eastern shore of
the lake and not the median line, as Tanzania claims. This development resuscitated an old
dispute that had been dormant since 1968. See Naomi Kok, Malawi: old border dispute with
Tanzania flares up again, INST. OF SECURITY STUD.: CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RISK ANAL-
YSIS DAILY BRIEFINGS, Aug. 8, 2012, at 2.
3. Political tensions between the two neighboring countries had endured for the
greater part of the 30-year period from 1964 to 1994, when President Kamuzu Banda lost
power following the first democratic elections since the country’s independence. The tensions
were centered on three issues. First, the countries had contrasting attitudes and policies to-
wards white minority regimes and the liberation struggles aimed at toppling them in
Namibia, Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique.
Second, President Banda suspected that Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere was aiding and
abetting attempts by certain prominent Malawian politicians exiled in Tanzania to subvert his
regime—these were former cabinet ministers who had broken ranks with Banda over policy
differences within a few months of the country’s independence and had fled into exile in
Tanzania and Zambia after resigning or being dismissed from the cabinet. Lastly, there re-
mained the unresolved dispute over the delimitation of the lake boundary between the two
states. See James Mayall, The Malawi-Tanzania Boundary Dispute, 11 J. MOD. AFR. STUD.
611 (1973). Evidence of a thaw in the Malawi-Tanzania relations can be seen in the fact that,
despite Malawi’s continuing complaints about Tanzania’s aid to President Banda’s oppo-
nents, the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1985. Relations between the two
countries were strengthened further in the immediate post-1994 period with the appointment
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of the dispute.4 The dispute over the lake boundary had first surfaced in
May 1967 and simmered for a while until September 1968. Since then, it
had not been the subject of any public statements by either side until it
flared up again in July 2012.
The current dispute can be traced to October 2011, when Malawi’s
late president Bingu wa Mutharika awarded a contract to a British com-
pany, Surestream Petroleum, to start gas and oil exploration on the east-
ern part of the lake, including in the area claimed by Tanzania.5 The
likelihood of a positive outcome to the prospecting gave rise to objections
on the Tanzanian side, encompassing other disagreements over the use of
the lake. Towards the end of July 2012, Tanzania announced plans to
purchase a new nine million dollar ferry to operate on Lake Malawi’s wa-
ters. Tanzanian authorities claimed that Malawian fishing and tourist boats
were encroaching on Tanzania’s waters.6 This resurgence in the dispute
was followed by a hurriedly arranged two-day meeting of top officials
of resident ambassadors to each other’s capital, a situation that prevails to this day. See PO-
LITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD 2014, 882 (Tom Lansford ed., 2014).
4. While senior authorities in both countries, including both former Malawian Presi-
dent Joyce Banda (in office from April 2012 to May 2014) and current Malawian President
Peter Mutharika, and Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete, have variously proclaimed their
determination to resolve the dispute peacefully and diplomatically, some authorities have
also been reported in their respective local media expressing readiness to use armed forces to
defend their sovereignty in relation to the disputed border. See, e.g., Courtney Meyer, Who
Owns Lake Nyasa?, AFRICA JUSTICE FOUNDATION (Aug. 21, 2012), http://africajusticefounda
tion.org/our-blog/news-articles/who-owns-lake-nyasa/ (quoting Edward Lowassa, chairman
of Tanzania’s parliamentary committee for defense, as saying, “[w]e expect this conflict will
be solved diplomatically . . .. Malawi is our neighbour and therefore we would not like to go
into war with it. However, if it reaches the war stage then we are ready to sacrifice our
people’s blood and our military forces are committed in equipment and psychologically.”). A
similar message was delivered by the Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation previously in an address to the Tanzanian parliament. On the Malawian side,
President Joyce Banda was quoted as declaring that she was ready to die for her people and
her land over the lake dispute. See I Shall Die For Malawi–President Banda, NYASA TIMES
(Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.nyasatimes.com/2012/08/11/i-shall-die-for-malawi-president-
banda/. Subsequent reporting quoted President Kikwete assuring the people of both coun-
tries that talk of resort to war was just media sensationalism. See G. Matoga, Border dispute
won’t end in war–Kikwete, DAILY TIMES, (Aug. 16, 2012), http://bntimes.com/index.php/
daily-times/headlines/national/11267-border-dispute-wont-end-in-war-kikwete/. The commit-
ment to avoid military confrontation in favor of a peaceful solution to the dispute was re-
peated by both leaders prior to and following discussions they held on the margins of the
thirty-second summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Maputo,
Mozambique, on Aug. 17–18, 2012. Since succeeding Joyce Banda as president, Peter
Mutharika has also ruled out going to war over the matter. See Rex Chikoko, No War Plan
against Tanzania over Lake, THE NATION (Aug. 13, 2014), http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/
No-war-plan-against-Tanzania-over-lake-says-Mutharika/-/1950946/2418414/-/format/xhtml/-/
12xywbsz/-/index.html.
5. Press Release, Surestream Petroleum Limited, Surestream Petroleum Awarded
Exploration Licences in Malawi (Sept. 22, 2011), http://surestream-petroleum.com/sure
stream-petroleum-awarded-exploration-licences-in-malawi/.
6. Courtney Meyer, Who Owns Lake Nyasa?, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Aug. 21, 2012),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/the-dark-side-of-natural-resources-st/other-articlesanalysis-and-
general-debate/51849-who-owns-lake-nyasa.html.
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from both countries. During these talks, Malawi rejected Tanzania’s de-
mand that Malawi stop any exploration or research activities for oil and
gas forthwith and its claim that this was likely to jeopardize the ongoing
negotiations and pose a security threat.7 Following these preliminary ne-
gotiations, the two parties agreed to submit the dispute to third-party me-
diation under the auspices of the sub-regional organization, the Southern
African Development Community (SADC).8 SADC mandated the head
of the Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government, former
Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano, to undertake the mediation.9
The gist of the dispute may be summarized as follows. Malawi asserts
that it enjoys sovereignty over the entire lake up to the Tanzanian shore-
line, as stipulated in Article I(2) of the Anglo-German Treaty of July 1,
1890 (hereinafter variously referred to as Anglo-German Treaty, Anglo-
German Agreement, or 1890 Agreement).10 Tanzania’s position is that, in
accordance with international norms and practice, the border ought to be
demarcated in the center of the lake, following the median line. Tanzania
points out that this is in fact the case with the delimitation of the Malawi-
Mozambique border on the southeastern half of the lake. Malawi counter-
claims that the Portuguese colonial authorities, by treaty, bartered a por-
tion of Mozambican territory by ceding sovereignty over two islands that
lie on the Mozambican side of the median line of the lake to the British
protectorate of Nyasaland in exchange for acquiring sovereignty over the
southeastern half of the lake. In brief, Malawi argues that the 1890 Agree-
ment specifically and deliberately departed from the presumption in inter-
national law in favor of locating the boundary along the median line of the
lake.
7. See Caroline Ngongondo, Malawi, Tanzania Will Not Go to War, THE NATION
(Aug. 17, 2012), http://mwnation.com/a%E2%82%AC%CB%9Cmalawi-tanzania-will-not-
go-to-wara%E2%82%AC%E2%84%A2/ (reporting that Malawi’s Foreign Minister
Ephraim Chiume and his Tanzanian counterpart Bernard Membe had reiterated the commit-
ment of their countries to resolve the dispute amicably even as Malawi rejected Tanzania’s
demand to stop oil exploration in the lake).
8. Chissano Agrees to Mediate Malawi, Tanzania over Lake Dispute, NYASA TIMES
(Dec. 23, 2012), http://www.nyasatimes.com/chissano-agrees-to-mediate-malawi-tanzania-
over-lake-dispute/.
9. Chissano was subsequently joined by former South African president Thabo
Mbeki and the former president of Botswana, Festus Mogae, as members of the mediation
team. See Mbeki in Lake Dispute Team, THE NATION (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.mwnation
.com/mbeki-in-lake-dispute-team/.
10. Also known as Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty, this agreement, inter alia, recognized
Tanganyika as a German colony; Britain ceded Heligoland, an island off the coast of Schles-
wig-Holstein in the North Sea, to Germany in return for Germany undertaking not to en-
croach into the British territory of Kenya. See 3 EDWARD HERTSLET, THE MAP OF AFRICA
BY TREATY 899–908 (3rd ed. 1909, rep. 1967).
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FIGURE 1. MAP OF MALAWI AND LAKE MALAWI/NYASA
(INSET: EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA)
Key:
 International boundary
- - - - - Median line in Lake Malawi/Nyasa claimed by Tanzania
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This article examines the legal aspects of the respective claims by the
two claimants to the northeastern stretches of the lake: to the eastern
shoreline by Malawi and to the median line by Tanzania (Figure 1). I pro-
ceed as follows. First, I sketch out the historical and political background
of the dispute and examine some preliminary legal issues in Part I. Part II
discusses the legal significance of boundaries, state succession to boundary
treaties, and the relevance of post-colonial African state practice in this
respect. A central aspect of this practice is the adoption by African states
of the principle of uti possidetis juris (or, more commonly, uti possidetis)
from the earliest days of their independence some fifty years ago. In Part
II, I address three additional, related issues: attribution of sovereignty
over islands in the disputed section of the lake, apparent lapses or failures
in colonial boundary demarcation, and the question whether the 1890
Agreement is a boundary treaty or a treaty of sphere of influence. In Part
III, I examine the issue of competition over resources as a factor in bound-
ary disputes and the relevance of the concept of borderlands to this dis-
pute. Part IV briefly assesses the prospects for SADC-sponsored third
party mediation in light of the setbacks the SADC has already exper-
ienced, noting the wavering commitment to the process and apparent lack
of trust displayed by one party. I argue that the failure of SADC media-
tion would not bode well for Tanzania, which prefers mediation to interna-
tional judicial settlement. On the other hand, adjudication by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which Malawi evidently favors, would
likely validate Malawi’s position. Notwithstanding the fact that the ICJ is
not formally bound by its own precedents, it is reasonable to assume that
the Court’s decisions in previous boundary disputes involving other Afri-
can states, some of which implicated the same Anglo-German Treaty, and
its reaffirmation of the principle of uti possidetis in these cases, would sug-
gest such an outcome. I conclude by reiterating the argument for a solu-
tion that upholds the principle of inviolability of borders, while allowing
for shared management of border resources, consistent with the most re-
cently developed norms of international law. This would transform the
border from a barrier into a bridge, connecting the two states and their
respective communities and serving as a shared environmental space. Such
a solution would be in line with SADC’s own approach to regional inte-
gration, as exemplified by the regional body’s spatial development
initiatives.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, FACTUAL ABSTRACT AND
PRELIMINARY LEGAL QUESTIONS
A. British and German Colonial Rule and the History
of the Boundary: 1890–1967
The present-day political entities of Malawi and Tanzania are British
and German colonial creations, respectively. The dispute over the lake has
its roots in the Anglo-German Treaty which, inter alia, defined the spheres
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of influence of the two European powers in East Africa.11 Article I(2) of
the Treaty is generally regarded as having set out the British and German
colonial territorial limits and thereby defined the boundary between Nya-
saland and Tanganyika. The question of whether this was a boundary
treaty stricto sensu or merely a treaty of spheres of influence is one that
will be addressed later.
Lake Malawi is the third largest and second deepest lake in Africa,
and the ninth largest in the world. In addition to the possibility of the
existence of oil and gas resources in the lake, it has been confirmed as a
habitat of more species of fish than any other body of freshwater in the
world, including an estimated several hundred species of cichlids.12 It is
the third largest lake in Africa (after Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika)
and has shorelines on western Mozambique, eastern Malawi, and southern
Tanzania. The lake was first visited by European travelers in the mid-nine-
teenth century, notably by both the Portuguese trader Candido Jose´ da
Costa Cardoso in 1846 and the Scottish missionary David Livingstone in
1859. Most of the territory to the west and south of the lake was subse-
quently claimed by Great Britain and formed into the Nyasaland protec-
torate. On their part, the Portuguese had already made territorial claims in
Central Africa and established the colony of Portuguese East Africa
(Mozambique).13 A treaty signed in 1891 between Great Britain and Por-
tugal defined their respective spheres of influence in the region. Under
this treaty, the latter’s sphere of influence covered the portion of the east-
ern shore of the lake lying immediately to the south of the southern
boundary of German East Africa (Tanganyika), about half way along the
eastern side of the lake (Figure 1).14
It is fashionable to describe the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 as lay-
ing the groundwork for the colonial “scramble for Africa.” But, as a mat-
ter of historical fact, the colonial occupation and partition of the continent
had already been underway by the time the conference was convened, on
November 14, 1884, at the invitation of Chancellor Bismarck of Germany.
The Berlin Conference was concluded on February 26, 1885 with the sign-
ing of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin, which, inter alia, set
out the procedural requirements under Articles 34 and 35 to be observed
11. See 3 HERTSLET, supra note 10. In addition, the treaty also demarcated several
other boundaries of colonial territories belonging to Great Britain and Germany elsewhere
in Africa (e.g. between modern day Nigeria and Cameroon in West-Central Africa and
Namibia and Botswana in Southern Africa).
12. A. J. Ribbink et al., A Preliminary Assessment of the Cichlid Fishes of Rocky Habi-
tats in Lake Malawi, 18 S. AFR. J. ZOOLOGY 147, 149–51 (1983); see generally AD KONING,
AD KONINGS’S BOOK OF CICHLIDS AND ALL THE OTHER FISHES OF LAKE MALAWI (1991).
13. See A. C. MCEWEN, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES OF EAST AFRICA 170–75
(1971).
14. Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal Defining the Spheres of Interest of the
Two Countries in Africa, Eng.–Port., June 11, 1891, 83 Brit. and For. State Papers 27
(1890–1891); see also 3 HERTSLET, supra note 10, at 1016–26. See MCEWEN, supra note 13, at
170–75, for a brief account of the negotiations between the British and Portuguese colonial
authorities over the Mozambique-Malawi lake boundary.
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by any European power taking possession of territory on the coasts of
Africa, or seeking to establish a protectorate there.15 Under these provi-
sions, any such occupying power was required to notify the other signatory
states of such occupation, or establishment of protectorate, and to “recog-
nize the obligation to [e]nsure the establishment of authority in regions
occupied by them on the coasts of the African Continent sufficient to pro-
tect existing rights.”16
The hypocrisy and injustice underlying the colonial project cannot be
overemphasized. The acquisition of radical title to territory in the newly
declared African colonies was premised on the prevailing notion in colo-
nial jurisprudence, based on the legal fiction of terra nullius, meaning
“land belonging to no one,” which held that the native African popula-
tions did not own these territories. Occupation and use of the territories
by native non-European communities was not regarded as rising to the
level of sovereign acts at par with the colonial declarations of possession
validated by the Berlin Act. Although it was claimed that for the most
part, the acquisition of African territories and subsequent delimitations
was based on prior treaties between the European colonial authorities and
local African rulers, it is generally accepted that the European powers se-
cured those treaties through a combination of coercion, inducement, and,
in some cases, outright deceit. The doctrine of terra nullius formed the
basis of European colonization and subsequent colonial land laws in Af-
rica and other parts of the world that came under European conquest and
occupation.17
The Berlin Act, and in particular Articles 34 and 35, which formed its
core, thus institutionalized and legitimized the European acquisition of
15. General Act of the Berlin Conference, arts. 34–35, Feb. 26, 1885, 2 HERTSLET, THE
MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY 484–85 (3rd ed., 1909, reprt. 1967). See Matthew Craven, Be-
tween Law and History: The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the Logic of Free Trade, 3
LONDON REV. INT’L L. 31, 44 (2015); SYBIL EYRE CROWE, THE BERLIN WEST AFRICA CON-
FERENCE 1884-1885, at 176–191 (1970); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF
NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, at 123 (2001), for a dis-
cussion of Articles 34 and 35.
16. 2 HERTSLET, supra note 15, at 485; see also Annex I to Protocol No. 8 of the Con-
ference: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE PROJECT OF DECLARATION RESPECTING NEW
OCCUPATIONS ON THE COASTS OF AFRICA, Conf. 4361, 1884–85 B.P.P., Vol. LV, p. 214. Ac-
cording to R.J. Harrison Church, “between 1885 and 1904 most of the present political map
was drawn, a process practically complete by 1919.” JEFFERY HERBST, The Creation and
Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa, 43 INT’L ORG. 673, 674 (1989).
17. A classic example of the jurisprudence articulating this doctrine is the Australian
case of Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. (generally known as the Gove land rights case), in
which Justice Richard Blackburn ruled that, according to the prevailing law, Australia was
terra nullius at the time of British colonization and, therefore, that the British Crown had the
power to extinguish native title, if it existed: (1971) 17 FLR 141. Subsequent cases unsuccess-
fully challenged this judgment until it was overturned in 1992 by the High Court of Australia
in the Mabo case, which introduced the doctrine of native title into Australian law and re-
moved the fiction of terra nullius. See Mabo and Others v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175
CLR 1 (Austl.).
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territory on the African continent in total disregard of African agency.18
Under this treaty, the European powers in effect agreed amongst them-
selves that effective occupation by Europeans alone was to be the norm
and the basis for the establishment of the Westphalian form of statehood
in Africa.19 As historians, legal scholars, and other commentators have
generally observed, this was a deliberate erasure of the subjectivity of non-
European peoples in Africa.20 The key instrument for the determination
of the modern Malawi–Tanzania boundary, the Anglo–German Treaty of
1890, was one of several treaties adopted by European colonial powers in
the aftermath of the Berlin Act. Specifically, in relation to the Nyasaland-
Tanganyika boundary, Article I(2) of the Agreement described the limit of
the “German sphere of influence . . . to the South” as follows:
To the south by a line which, starting on coast at the northern limit
of the Province of Mozambique, follows the course of the River
18. See 2 HERTSLET, supra note 15, at 468. Article 34 is particularly pertinent in this
respect. It provided that:
Any Power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of
the African Continent outside of its present possessions, or which, being hitherto
without such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the Power which assumes a
Protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act with a notification thereof,
addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act, in order to enable
them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own.
19. The Berlin Conference has been described as “an important moment in the for-
malization of the international legal structure of imperialism” and the importation of the
notion of the modern territorial state into the purported terra nullius of Africa. CHINA
MIEVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 253
(2005); see also ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 90–6, 111–12 (2004) (noting that the effect of the Berlin Conference was “to
transform Africa into a conceptual terra nullius,” and that, as such, “only dealings between
European states with respect to those territories could have decisive legal effect”); CROWE,
supra note 15, at 158–59; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 263–69 (2nd ed., 2006) (discussing the legal personality of indigenous communities not
regarded as states and the acquisition of territory from indigenous communities).
20. There is a copious literature by historians and legal scholars, in particular, on the
role and significance of the Berlin Act in the scheme of the colonization of Africa and the
development of international law. These range from nineteenth century commentators, such
as JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 129–89 (1894),
to more modern writers, including THOMAS PAKENNHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA:
1876–1912 (1991); R. ANAND, NEW STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (1972); U. O.
UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 26 (1979); and KOSKEN-
NIEMI, supra note 15, at 121–27. See also BISMARCK, EUROPE AND AFRICA: THE BERLIN
AFRICA CONFERENCE 1884–1885 AND THE ONSET OF PARTITION (S. Fo¨rster, W. Mommsen
& R. Robinson eds., 1988) (containing a number of perceptive essays on this subject, includ-
ing Ronald Robinson, The Conference in Berlin and the Future of Africa, 1884–1885, at 1;
Jorg Fisch, Africa as terra nullius: The Berlin Conference and International Law, 347, 354–60;
John D Hargreaves, The Berlin Conference, West African Boundaries, and the Eventual Parti-
tion, 313); S. GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI–SOVEREIGNS AND AFRICANS: RACE AND
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69–75 (1996); Andrew Fitzmaurice, The Gen-
ealogy of Terra Nullius, 129 AUSTL. HIST. STUD. 1, 10–11 (2001); Andrew Fitzmaurice, SOV-
EREIGNTY, PROPERTY AND EMPIRE: 1500–2000 at 285–90 (2014).
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Rovuma to the point of confluence of the Msinje; thence it runs
westward along the parallel of that point till it reaches Lake
Nyassa; thence striking northward, it follows the eastern, north-
ern, and western shores of the lake to the northern bank of the
mouth of the River Songwe. . . .21
The language of this provision is clear: the whole of the northern part
of the lake was part of Nyasaland and not within the German sphere of
influence. And, significantly, the shoreline boundary is shown clearly on a
map referred to later in the text of this provision.22 The 1890 Agreement
has never been amended by any subsequent international agreement, thus
leading to the obvious conclusion that Article I(2) is the critical provision
with regard to the disputed sovereignty over the lake. That said, it is also
apt to note that the 1890 Agreement did not establish a precise boundary
between adjacent sovereign territories. Rather, as its title makes clear, it
delimited “spheres of influence,” leaving the actual delimitation of the
boundaries subject to subsequent agreement. According to Article VI:
“All the lines of demarcation traced in Articles II to IV shall be subject to
rectification by agreement between the two Powers, in accordance with
local requirements.”23
In accordance with this provision, mixed boundary commissions were
subsequently established to demarcate boundary lines on the ground. As it
happened, the Mixed Boundary Commission (or Anglo-German Bound-
ary Commission), established in 1898 to demarcate the Nyasa section of
the Tanganyika-Nyasaland boundary, apparently commenced its work at
the mouth of the Songwe River and proceeded westward to Lake Tan-
ganyika without considering the shore boundary of Lake Nyasa. It is plau-
sible that this was precisely what was intended: namely to focus only on
the Lake Tanganyika–Lake Nyasa part, while treating the Lake Nyasa sec-
tion as self-evident. On this interpretation, demarcation of the boundary in
this disputed section was not supposed to be part of its remit. Thus,
McEwen has suggested that “no doubt at the time it seemed obvious that a
boundary defined in terms of a lake shore was self-demarcating and re-
quired no physical investigation.”24 An alternative interpretation is that
this was a lapse that laid the basis for the apparent ambiguity subsequently
invoked by Tanzania in partial justification of its claim of sovereignty over
the lake. I discuss such lapses in colonial boundary–making in Part II
below.
21. 3 HERTSLET, supra note 10.
22. IAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPE-
DIA 958 (1979).
23. 3 HERTSLET, supra note 10.
24. MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 179. See Protocol Containing the Decisions of the
Commissioner Appointed to Delimit the Nyasa–Tanganyika Boundary, Br.–Ger., Nov. 11,
1898, 92 BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS 797 (1899–1900) (Brit.), reprinted in 3 HERTSLET,
supra note 10, at 916–19.
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Following the end of the First World War, the former German colony
of Tanganyika was awarded to Great Britain under the League of Nations
Mandate System in 1922.25 As a result, Tanganyika’s border with Nyasa-
land became an internal administrative division. From an international law
perspective, Great Britain, as the Mandatory, could not have unilaterally
changed the boundary without the authority of the Council, which is why
the period preceding 1922 is crucial for the title. Tanganyika subsequently
became a trust territory under the United Nations Trusteeship System,
which replaced the Mandate System in 1945.26 Thus, it has been suggested
by Rosalyn Higgins that from 1922 until 1961, when Tanganyika became
independent, the boundary with Nyasaland had been a matter of adminis-
trative convenience rather than political importance, at least from the
British perspective, since Britain controlled both sides of the territory.27
After Tanzania’s independence, what had in effect been an internal admin-
istrative division under British rule reverted to being an international
boundary.
Unsurprisingly, Higgins identifies the period 1890 to 1922 as particu-
larly critical, “being marked at the outset by a Treaty between Great Brit-
ain and Germany and at the end by the institution of the League of
Nations Mandate System.”28 Brownlie and McEwen are in agreement that
title to the disputed territory must have been formed during this period, as
no changes could thereafter occur without the consent of the League or
later the United Nations.29 Higgins categorically notes that no such con-
sent was ever sought. Later materials thus go more to questions of evi-
25. See League of Nations Covenant art. 22(1). Germany lost its colonial possessions
pursuant to the terms of Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. Great Britain and
Belgium, whose troops occupied German East Africa during the war, took over the German
colonies in East Africa under the League of Nations Mandate System. The Mandate System
was proclaimed under Article 22(1) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The German
colonies and protectorates of Tanganyika and Ruanda–Urundi were designated as “Class B”
Mandates and awarded to Great Britain and Belgium respectively.
26. U.N. Charter arts. 75, 77 ¶ 1(a), http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/. The
new Trusteeship System was established under Article 75 of the United Nations Charter to
replace the League of Nations Mandate System. Under Article 77(1)(a) of the Charter, the
territories held under [the League of Nations] mandate became trust territories, with the
Mandate Powers maintaining their positions as the administering authorities of the trust ter-
ritories under specific trusteeship agreements. Article 77(1)(a) provides: “The trusteeship
system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder
by means of trusteeship agreements: a. territories now held under [mandate].”
27. Rosalyn Higgins, Lake Nyasa (Malawi) International Boundary: Legal Opinion 6
(1988) (unpublished paper) (on file with author). The legal opinion was commissioned by
Mobil Oil Corporation, which wanted to explore for oil and gas on the lake through
Tanzania. Dame Higgins prepared this opinion when she was a professor of international law
at the London School of Economics, before she was elected to the International Court of
Justice.
28. Id. at 2.
29. Ian Brownlie, A Provisional View of the Dispute Concerning Sovereignty over Lake
Malawi/Nyasa, 1 E. AFR. L. REV. 258, 259–60, 272 (1968); BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at
956–57; see also, MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 175.
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dence of understanding, or acquiescence, rather than to initial
establishment of title.30
However, there is no common agreement among these commentators
on the interpretation and conclusion to be placed on the evidence of un-
derstanding or acquiescence. The issue of supposed acquiescence by the
British authorities in German public acts relating to the disputed territory
is discussed in another context below.
The non-demarcation of the boundary on the ground in the disputed
section is compounded by another factor: notwithstanding some subse-
quent inconsistent cartographic representations and textual descriptions
by British authorities, the eastern shoreline of the lake was never formally
changed from an agreement on a “sphere of influence,” the formal title of
the 1890 Agreement, to an agreement on a precise “boundary agreement.”
Yet, neither Great Britain nor Germany regarded it as anything other than
a boundary treaty, which also regulated various boundaries between Brit-
ish and German colonial possessions in central, eastern and southern Af-
rica. Among the few writers and commentators who have addressed this
dispute specifically, none have sought to draw any legal significance from
the fact that the 1890 Agreement delineated spheres of influence rather
than actual boundaries.31
In fact, another treaty was concluded by the same parties in 1901: the
Agreement between Great Britain and Germany relative to the Boundary
of the British and German Spheres of Interest between Lake Nyasa and
Lake Tanganyika of February 23, 1901.32 The treaty accepted and incorpo-
rated the proposals of the 1898 Mixed Commission. Section 1 detailed pre-
cisely the line of demarcation running northwest from the mouth of the
Songwe River in the northeast corner of the lake, but it did not affect the
eastern shoreline.33
The delineation of the Mozambique-Nyasaland boundary in the south-
ern half of the lake was the subject of several treaties between Great Brit-
ain and Portugal, including: the 1891 Agreement mentioned earlier,34 the
Agreement relative to the Spheres of Influence north of the Zambesi of
30. Higgins, supra note 27, at 2.
31. Although the dispute has attracted some media attention and commentary since its
current resurgence, especially in the two countries concerned, there has as yet been very little
new substantive published scholarly discussion of it. See Mi Yung Yoon, Colonialism and
Border Disputes in Africa: The Case of the Malawi-Tanzania Dispute over Lake Malawi/
Nyasa, 1 J. TERRITORIAL AND MAR. STUD. 75 (2014) (providing an isolated example that is
nonetheless too brief in scope and perfunctory in its analysis of, especially, the legal and
historical aspects).
32. 95 BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS 780 (1901–02); see also 3 HERTSLET, supra note
10, at 925.
33. 3 HERTSLET, supra note 10, at 925–26 (Sec. 1 of the Agreement) (“The boundary
shall take the following course, indicated on the annexed map by a black line, excepting
where natural watercourses form the boundary.”).
34. See Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal Defining the Spheres of Interest of
the Two Countries in Africa, supra note 14.
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1893,35 Exchange of Notes of 21 January, 1953,36 and the Agreement re-
garding the Nyasaland-Mozambique Frontier of November 18, 1954.37
Collectively these treaties, defining the respective spheres of the two pow-
ers in this part of east and central Africa, provided for a mutually agreed
boundary running down the median line of Lake Nyasa, while recognizing
two islands located within Mozambican waters in this section of the lake as
part of the Nyasaland protectorate. Article 1(1) of the Agreement of 1954
provided that:
[The] frontier on Lake Nyasa shall run due west from the point
where the frontier of Mozambique and Tanganyika meets the
shore of the Lake to the median line of the waters of the same
lake and shall then follow the median line to its point of intersec-
tion with the geographical parallel of Beacon 17 as described in
the Exchange of Notes of the 6th of May, 1920, which shall consti-
tute the southern frontier.38
This provision was merely reaffirming an understanding between the
United Kingdom and Portugal recorded in the Exchange of Notes of 1953,
whose pertinent provisions had provided, in part:
1. I have the honor to state that Her Majesty’s Government in
the United Kingdom have given the most careful attention to the
views expressed by the Portuguese representatives when in July
1951 they received the Governor of [Nyasaland].
2. In these conversations the Portuguese delegation expressed
the hope that the United Kingdom, in consequence of the Portu-
guese proposal and in harmony with the point previously men-
tioned in the Embassy’s Note of June 27, 1951, would be prepared
to consider recognizing the frontier of Mozambique and Nyasa-
land in Lake Nyasa as running along the Median Line of its
[waters].39
35. Agreement between Great Britain and Portugal Relative to Spheres of Influence
North of the Zambesi, Gr. Brit.–Port., May 31–June 5, 1893, Gr. Brit. TS No. 10 (1893).
36. Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Between Her Majesty’s Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Portuguese
Government Providing for Portuguese Participation in the Shire Valley Project, Gr.
Brit.–Port., Jan. 21, 1953, 175 U.N.T.S. 14.
37. Agreement between the United Kingdom Acting on Its Own Behalf and on Behalf
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Portugal Regarding Nyasa-
land–Mozambique Frontier art. 2 ¶ 1, Gr. Brit.–Por., Nov. 18, 1954, 325 U.N.T.S. 307, 310; see
also 161 BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS 173 (1954).
38. Agreement between the United Kingdom Acting on Its Own Behalf and on Behalf
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Portugal Regarding Nyasa-
land–Mozambique Frontier, supra note 40, art. 1.
39. Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement between Her Majesty’s Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Portuguese
Government Providing for Portuguese Participation in the Shire Valley Project, supra note
36, at 14.
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The attribution of sovereignty over the islands to the United Kingdom
was quid pro quo for British cooperation with the Portuguese over
projects affecting the Shire and Zambezi rivers, both of which flowed from
the former’s colonial territories into the latter’s. Likoma Island, which was
used as a mission station by Britain’s Universities’ Mission to Central Af-
rica, and the nearby islet of Chizumulu, were thus incorporated into the
Nyasaland protectorate.40 Under Article 1(2) of the Agreement of 1954,
the United Kingdom retained sovereignty over these islands with full, un-
restricted and unconditional rights of access and sovereignty over a belt of
water two sea miles wide surrounding each of the islands.41 To this day,
the islands have remained uncontested lacustrine Malawian exclaves:
Malawian territory surrounded by Mozambican waters.
On the basis of the foregoing, the conclusion that the 1890 Agreement
remains the most relevant colonial–era treaty with a bearing on the cur-
rent lake boundary dispute seems obvious and perfectly warranted. Con-
versely, it has been pointed out—and this could be part of Tanzania’s
argument, although it has not been publicly expressed before—that evi-
dence of certain public acts by both the British and German governments
in the post-1890 period points to an acceptance by both sides that the
boundary between Nyasaland and Tanganyika was formed by the median
line and not the eastern shore as stipulated in the 1890 Agreement. The
evidence for this is sought in public (or sovereign) acts by the German
authorities and cartographic representations in maps and official reports
issued by both the British and German governments during the post-1890
period, and it is argued that these were sufficient to redraw an interna-
tional boundary in the circumstances of uncertainty.42 But, the evidence is
inconsistent.
(i) Public (Sovereign) Acts. The most notable public acts cited in the
few published legal and historical commentaries on the Malawi-Tanzania
boundary concern the launching by Germany of a steamer, the Hermann
von Wissmann, in 1893 and subsequent vessels and its navigation activities
on the northeastern section of the lake.43 It has been argued that because
Britain did not protest these activities within its territory, it must be as-
sumed to have acquiesced to the virtual redrawing of the lake boundary
from the eastern shore to the median line. Both Day and Brownlie point
to these activities as evidence that German sovereignty was in practice
40. Agreement between Great Britain and Portugal Relative to Spheres of Influence
North of the Zambesi, supra note 35, art. IV (“The Islands of Chisamulo and Lukomo, or
Dikomo, and all other islands of Lake Nyasa farther to the south, shall be recognized as
being within the British sphere of influence.”).
41. Agreement between the United Kingdom Acting on Its Own Behalf and on Behalf
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Portugal Regarding Nyasaland-
Mozambique Frontier, supra note 40, at 2.
42. Brownlie, supra note 29, at 259–61.
43. RUDOLF FITZNER, KOLONIAL-HANDBUCH, VOL. I 338–39 (1901).
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established, and accepted by Britain, up to the median line.44 Writing
shortly after the dispute first arose when the post-colonial government of
Tanzania made its claim over the lake in 1967, Brownlie categorically con-
cluded that “[t]he evidence is, however, that the United Kingdom had ac-
cepted a middle line before the onset of the [League of Nations] Mandate
and for a long while after 1922.”45
Significantly, Brownlie changed his position somewhat a decade later
when he conceded that Article VIII of the 1890 Agreement provided for
the right of free navigation on the lake to both sides and concluded that
“[the] provisions of Article VIII tend to render German activity less deci-
sive as a matter of evidence.”46 This being the case, it is pointless to read
into the absence of British protest against German navigation on the lake
as acceptance of German sovereignty over the lake. In fact, given that the
ostensible reason for the launching of the Hermann von Wissmann was to
assist in the suppression of the slave trade, Britain was unlikely to protest
against activities that it also supported as a self-proclaimed champion of
the anti-slavery crusade. Moreover, McEwen reports that following the
capture of the Hermann von Wissmann by Britain at the beginning of the
First World War, apparently due to the fact that the German authorities
were then using it for commercial purposes, there does not appear to have
been any other activities by vessels based on the eastern shore.47 The al-
leged evidence of sovereign public acts by Germany in the contested wa-
ters seems both exaggerated and inconsistent.
On the British side, there was also a series of public acts, such as Or-
ders-in-Council, contained in the Laws of Nyasaland before and leading to
the proclamation of the Nyasaland protectorate.48 While some Orders-in-
44. ALAN J. DAY ET AL., BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 140 (1982); Brownlie,
supra note 29, at 259–61.
45. Brownlie, supra note 29, at 271.
46. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 959. Article VIII states, in part: “The two Powers
engage to apply in all the portions of their respective spheres, within the limits of the zone
defined by the Act of Berlin [of 1885]: The navigation of the lakes, rivers, and canals, and of
the ports on these waters, is free to both [flags].” It is fairly clear that Brownlie’s earlier
commentary on the dispute was more sympathetic to Tanzania’s claim. While nothing signifi-
cant may be read into the fact that he wrote this at a time when he was based at the Univer-
sity of Dar es Salaam as a visiting professor, his “provisional view,” as he termed it,
presumably reflected only a tentative assessment of the merits of a recently emergent
dispute.
47. See MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 192. In the post-colonial period, notwithstanding
the unresolved dispute, Malawi and Tanzania have cooperated on some aspects of the use of
the lake, including water transportation. In 1995, the two governments signed an agreement
allowing ships to visit ports on the other’s shores, but without prejudice to the matter of the
boundary. Article 2 of the Agreement provides as follows: “Notwithstanding anything con-
tained in this Agreement or any other operational Agreements relating hereto nothing
therein may be construed as affecting any territorial matters between the Contracting Par-
ties.” Lake Shipping and Port Services Agreement between the Government of the United
Republic of Tanzania and the Government of the Republic of Malawi art. 2, Tanz.–Malawi,
Jan. 27, 1995, (unpublished treaty) (on file with author).
48. MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 181–83.
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Council had been inconsistent in the description of the Nyasaland bound-
ary in the lake, later versions corrected the discrepancies, thus removing
any presumption that the United Kingdom had acquiesced in the earlier
German acts.49
(ii) Maps and Reports. The period 1890–1922 saw the production of a
number of maps in both Britain and Germany on which the boundary was
variously shown as a median line or an eastern shoreline.
On the German side, a number of maps reproduced in a 1909 publica-
tion on the German colonial empire confusingly depicted both the median
and shoreline.50 Notably, an official map published in 1918, at the height
of the First World War, marked the median line as the boundary.51 A sub-
sequent publication in 1920 also depicted the median line as the bound-
ary.52 McEwen, who discusses these maps in some detail, dismisses the
latter maps as of little probative value given that they were published at a
time when Great Britain and Germany were at war with each other or
immediately following the war, and thus a time of heightened tension. It
should also be noted that these maps did not explicitly purport to override
the delimitation of the German sphere of influence provided for in Article
I(2) of the Treaty of 1890.
The maps produced on the British side during this period are equally
inconsistent in their depiction of the median line and the shoreline. An
early map in the British Admiralty’s Handbook of German East Africa of
1916 (hereinafter the Handbook), discussed in some detail by McEwen,
showed the median line.53 McEwen notes that the map is not dated and
contains no reference to the cartographer. He further suggests that the
map seems to be “essentially a sketch” and that the compilers may have
been misled by the presence of German vessels on the lake, as noted in the
Handbook, to assume that the international boundary ran along the me-
dian line.54 Among other British maps produced during this period was
that in the Annual Report on Tanganyika for 1922, which showed an east-
ern shoreline boundary and one that appeared in the Times Survey Atlas
of the World for the same year showing the median line.55
49. See id., for a brief discussion of some of the inconsistencies in the Orders-in-
Council.
50. 1 DAS DEUTSCHE KOLONIALREICH [THE GERMAN COLONIAL EMPIRE] 416 (Hans
Meyer ed., 1909).
51. MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 186 (citing DIETRICH REIMER, REICHSKOLONIALAMT,
MITTELAFRIKA IN KARTEN [IMPERIAL COLONIAL OFFICE, MIDDLE AFRICA IN MAPS]
(1918)).
52. See 1 DEUTSCHES KOLONIAL–LEXIKON (H. von Schnee ed., 1920) (maps).
MCEWEN notes that the maps are inconsistent with Dr. von Schnee’s textual references the
boundary agreements. See MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 186.
53. British Admiralty War Staff Intelligence Division, A Handbook of German East
Africa 7 (1916).
54. MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 187.
55. Id. at 187–88.
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The probative value of these maps is as doubtful as that of the maps
produced on the German side. The uncertain provenance of the map—or
“essentially a sketch”—in the Handbook and the non-official nature of the
Times Survey Atlas make it difficult to conclude that the British had inten-
tionally redelineated the boundary. Remarkably, the Annual Reports on
Tanganyika from 1924 to 1932 referred to the median line as the lake
boundary, but some confusion persisted.56 In some cases, a map showing
the median line as a boundary was submitted along with the report, but for
the reports submitted in 1933 and 1934, the text continued to refer to a
median line boundary, while the accompanying maps showed the eastern
shoreline.57 Yet, from 1935 to 1938 both the texts and accompanying maps
of the reports indicated an eastern shoreline boundary.58 This practice
continued in the period of the U.N. Trusteeship when reports from 1948 to
1953 all showed a shoreline boundary.59 In 1959, the British Government
advised the Government of Tanganyika, then a self-governing territory,
that it did not consider that any part of Lake Nyasa fell within the bounda-
ries of Tanganyika. This position was subsequently reaffirmed in a state-
ment by the Prime Minister of the newly independent government in
1962.60
The inconsistent positions adopted by both Britain and Germany as
reflected in various official and unofficial maps, reports, and publications
spanned three periods: 1890 to 1922, prior to the establishment of the
League of Nations Mandate; 1922 to 1945, during the Mandate; and after
1945, the period of the U.N. Trusteeship leading up to self-government
and independence in 1961. These inconsistencies make it difficult to dis-
cern any intention on either side to amend the delimitation of the bound-
ary in the 1890 Agreement. In any event, during the Mandate and
Trusteeship, Britain, as Mandatory and Trust Power, could not have
changed the boundary unilaterally, for that would have amounted to
changing the terms of its Mandate and Trusteeship, its own status and
powers, without the authorization of the Council of the League or the
U.N. Security Council. In brief, there is no basis for reading into the maps
produced on both sides any deliberate intention to change the boundary
or line of sphere of influence from that agreed in 1890. The apparent am-
biguities, contradictions, and lapses in these maps can be explained by any
number of factors, including a lack of knowledge on the part of the cartog-
raphers responsible for the maps and mistaken assumptions about the ac-
tual location of the boundary.
56. Mayall, supra note 3, at 623.
57. See Aleck Che-Mponda, The Malawi-Tanzania Border and Territorial Dispute,
1968: A Case Study of Boundary and Territorial Imperatives in the New Africa 109 (1972)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Howard University) (on file with author).
58. Id.
59. Mayall, supra note 3, at 623. After becoming the Mandatory Power, Britain contin-
ued to submit the Annual Reports to the League of Nations.
60. See Che-Mponda, supra note 57, at 163. See also discussion in Section C, infra.
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B. Legal Significance and Probative Value of Maps
in Boundary Disputes: An Excursus
It goes without saying that maps provide an invaluable aid to the in-
terpretation of boundary agreements. Indeed, many boundary descriptions
are almost unintelligible unless accompanied by a pictorial representation
of the lines they purport to establish. Furthermore, it has been argued that
the judicial approach to the assessment of the cogency of such cartographi-
cal evidence has undergone a shift over the years.61 Improvements in car-
tographic techniques have ensured that modem maps are more reliable
representations of boundary delimitations than was ever the case in previ-
ous centuries. In several early boundary disputes, courts and tribunals
were often presented with maps of doubtful authenticity and origin, which,
in many instances, were found to bear inaccurate relationships to the geo-
graphical conditions they purported to portray. This is a problem that was,
in fact, readily admitted and recognized by the British authorities. In these
circumstances, there developed a general presumption in international law
that in the event of inconsistencies between the textual descriptions of a
boundary and a contemporaneous, or even a subsequent, map, the former
prevails over the latter.
The Island of Palmas Case (United States v. The Netherlands)62 and
the Labrador Boundary case63 are among the earlier cases in which the
relative evidentiary value of maps was examined. In the more recent Rann
of Kutch Arbitration, the tribunal rejected the maps presented by India
with the observation that “[p]ersuasive evidence though the maps showing
a conterminous boundary may be at first glance [they are] in the circum-
stances of the present case not conclusive support for a positive claim to
sovereign title on the part of the Kutch and the other Indian States abut-
ting upon the Rann.”64
Similarly, and even more to the point, Judge Moreno Quintana ob-
served in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thailand)65 that there is a well-established rule of international law, exem-
plified by Article 29 of the Treaty of Versailles, which states that when
there is a discrepancy concerning a frontier delimitation between the text
of a treaty and a map, it is the text, and not the map, that prevails.66
61. For a recent discussion of the evolving international judicial views on the probative
value of maps in boundary disputes, see Hyung K. Lee, Mapping the Law of Legalizing
Maps: The Implications of the Emerging Rule on Map Evidence in International Law, 14 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 159 (2005).
62. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
63. Re: Labrador Boundary (1927), 2 D.L.R. 401 (Can.).
64. Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India v. Pak.), 7 I.L.M. 633, 695 (1968); see also The
Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Between Indian and Pakistan (India v. Pak.), 17 R.I.A.A. 1
(1968) (providing the full text).
65. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (June
15).
66. Id. at 70 (Quintana, J., dissenting). On the question of the legal significance of
maps in boundary disputes, see generally Sakeus Akweenda, The Legal Significance of Maps
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The more recent decisions of the ICJ, both concerning boundary dis-
putes involving African states, provide more significant and authoritative
guidance. In the Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), the ICJ
expressed the view that textual instruments constitute the primary source
for determining and interpreting international boundaries.67 Included in
this category are: formal treaties between states, colonial decrees estab-
lishing or reconfiguring colonies, orders by the top colonial administrators
and exchange of letters between them, etc.68 As we have seen, no treaty or
decree relating to the Nyasaland–Tanganyika boundary was signed follow-
ing the Anglo–German Treaty of 1890 amending the provision in Article
I(2) of that treaty regarding the Lake Nyasa section of the boundary. In
the Frontier Dispute Case, the Court also expressed the view that maps
and cartographical instruments only constitute ancillary or corroborative
sources of evidence, and that maps cannot of themselves constitute a terri-
torial title with intrinsic legal force.69 Rather, the Court held that maps
may acquire legal force only when they become physical expressions of the
will of the state or states concerned, for example, when a map is annexed
to an official text of which it forms an integral part. It is instructive to
quote the relevant part of the Court’s judgment in extenso:
[Maps] merely constitute information which varies in accuracy
from case to case; of themselves, and by virtue solely of their exis-
tence, they cannot constitute a territorial title, that is, a document
endowed by international law with intrinsic legal force for the pur-
pose of establishing territorial rights. Of course, in some cases
maps may acquire such legal force, but where this is so the legal
force does not arise solely from their intrinsic merits: it is because
such maps fall into the category of physical expressions of the will
of the State or States concerned. This is the case, for example,
when maps are annexed to an official text of which they form an
integral part. Except in this clearly defined case, maps are only
extrinsic evidence of varying reliability or unreliability which may
be used, along with other evidence of a circumstantial kind, to
establish or reconstitute the real facts.70
The Court then went on to conclude categorically that, “maps can still
have no greater legal value than that of corroborative evidence endorsing
a conclusion at which a court has arrived by other means unconnected
with the maps.”71
in Boundary Questions: A Reappraisal with Particular Emphasis on Namibia, 60 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 205 (1989).
67. Frontier Dispute Case (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 554, 602
(Dec. 22).
68. Id. at 580–81.
69. Id. at 582–83.
70. Id. at 582.
71. Id. at 583.
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A few years later, the Court pointedly recalled its decision and the
above dicta approvingly in the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Botswana v. Namibia).72 In all these cases, it is obvious that, from the
Court’s point of view, the intention of the parties is the one critical factor
underlying this question. A map that depicts the location of a boundary
differently from an agreed textual instrument cannot of itself be presumed
to amount to a unilateral declaration by the state concerned to change a
legal or factual situation. Thus, in the Frontier Dispute Case, the Court
reiterated its earlier view in the Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v.
France)73 that a declaration by one state concerning a legal or factual situ-
ation cannot create legal obligations except “when it is the intention of the
State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its
terms [and] that intention confers on the declaration the character of a
legal undertaking.”74
Another analogous and relevant situation was presented in the Argen-
tina–Chile Frontier Case.75 One of the issues was whether Argentina was
estopped from denying that the boundary should follow a particular
course as a result of an erroneous depiction of the frontier on a map for
which it was allegedly responsible. This case has been described as “au-
thority for the proposition that the principles of estoppel, admission, and
acquiescence are not applicable in the present circumstances.”76 All these
highly authoritative judicial pronouncements only point to one conclusion:
cartographic representations cannot override the express and unambigu-
ous provisions of a treaty. This general proposition has been supported by
other commentators.77
It may be concluded, on the basis of the foregoing examination, that
the erroneous depictions on the various colonial and post–colonial maps
of the boundary, the inconsistencies in some British and German colo-
nial–era reports, as well as more recent (and current) Tanzanian maps,
cannot be held to have “constructively amended” Article I(2) of the An-
glo–German Treaty. The territorial limit of the British protectorate of
Nyasaland thus extended to the eastern shoreline of Lake Nyasa through-
out the period from 1890 to its independence in 1964. On this reading, it is
legitimate to conclude that Malawi does, in fact, have sovereignty over the
disputed part of the lake as a successor to the former colonial power that
exercised sovereignty over Nyasaland. The Agreement of 1890 is binding
on both Malawi and Tanzania, in accordance with the rules of contempo-
rary international law governing the succession of states to boundary trea-
72. Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045
(Dec. 13).
73. Nuclear Test Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgments, 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (Dec. 20).
74. Frontier Dispute Case (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 554, 573
(Dec. 22) (quoting Nuclear Test Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgments, 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (Dec. 20)).
75. Argentine-Chile Frontier Case (Arg. v. Chile), 16 R.I.A.A. 109 (1966).
76. See Akweenda, supra note 66, at 249.
77. See generally Lee, supra note 61.
Spring 2016] Oil Under Troubled Waters 371
ties and the principle of uti possidetis, collectively adopted and recognized
by African states, as I argue in Part II below.
C. Prelude to the Dispute: The Post–Independence Period, 1961–1967
The Government of Tanganyika accepted both before, and immedi-
ately after, independence that no part of the lake fell within its jurisdic-
tion. The position that had been expressed early in 1959 by the British
Government, as mentioned earlier in Section A(ii) of this Part (‘Maps and
Reports’), that the borders of Tanganyika remained as they were demar-
cated in 1890, was subsequently reconfirmed in a statement by the Minis-
ter for Lands and Mineral Resources to the Tanganyika Legislative
Council in May of the same year. The issue of the proper location of the
lake boundary was raised early in the life of the legislature of the self-
governing territory. Responding to a question, the minister stated that:
In the Treaty of Peace made with Germany after the 1914-1918
War, the boundaries of Tanganyika followed those described in
Article II [sic] of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890. The
description of the southern boundaries of Tanganyika, which in-
clude the boundaries of Nyasaland, are as follows: from the point
of confluence of the Rovuma River with the Msinje River, the
boundary runs westward along the parallel of that point until it
reaches Lake Nyasa, thence striking northward it follows the East-
ern, Northern and Western shores of Lake Nyasa to the northern
bank of the mouth of the River Songwe; it ascends that river to
the point of its intersection by the 33rd degree of east longitude.78
The Council was informed again by the Tanganyika Attorney General
on December 15, 1959 that, following consultations with the British Colo-
nial Office: “[It] was the opinion of the legal advisers to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies that the southern boundary of Tanganyika lies along
the Eastern, Northern and Western shores of Lake Tanganyika [sic] and
that therefore not a part of the Lake lies within the boundaries of
Tanganyika.”79
Despite these unequivocal statements by the colonial authorities in
the Tanganyika Legislative Council, some members of the Council per-
sisted with the demand that, as a matter of justice and for the benefit of
the people who depended on the lake for their livelihood, the Tanganyika
Government should engage with the Nyasaland Government through her
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom with a view to secure a
more equitable boundary. The charge was led by one Chief Mhaiki, a
member of the Legislative Council from the Songea district adjoining the
78. Mayall, supra note 3, at 612 (quoting Tanganyika Legislative Council, Official Re-
port (Dar es Salaam, May 26, 1959)).
79. Id. (quoting Tanganyika Legislative Council, Official Report). It is not clear
whether the substitution of Lake Taganyika for Lake Nyasa was in the original statement by
the Attorney-General or was an editorial mistake in the report of the Legislative Council.
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lake. Mayall notes that in a statement he made in the Council in October
1960, “Chief Mhaiki alleged that as a result of flooding in 1956, following
the construction of the Kariba Dam, Tanganyikan houses and plantations
were inundated and the owners had been unable to claim compensa-
tion.”80 Since the Kariba Dam was constructed on the Zambezi River, and
nowhere near Lake Nyasa, this claim was rather improbable and palpably
factually incorrect, but seems to have gone unchallenged both in the Legis-
lative Council and, more surprisingly, by at least one scholarly
commentator.81
At any rate, Chief Mhaiki’s motion was not adopted. Not only did the
colonial administration repeat its previous official interpretation of the
boundary, but the Minister for Lands, Surveys and Water, an ex officio
member of the Council, conceded that his department was responsible for
the publication of the inconsistent maps showing a “median” line as the
boundary, which he said was the result of “a mistaken impression that this
was the correct and natural boundary in all inland waters.”82
The most telling statement, however, came from Prime Minister Julius
Nyerere himself. Although he conceded that there was justice in what had
been claimed as the usual practice of dividing shared waters between
neighbors, he spoke against the motion in categorical terms:
I must emphasize [again] there is now no doubt at all about this
boundary. We know that not a drop of the water of Lake Nyasa
belongs to Tanganyika under the terms of the agreement, so that
in actual fact we would be asking a neighboring Government [to]
change the boundary in favor of Tanganyika. Some people think
this is easier in the case of water and it might be much more diffi-
cult in the case of land. I don’t know the logic about this.83
Following this, the matter rested until after Tanganyika’s indepen-
dence on December 9, 1961, when in June 1962, Chief Mhaiki raised the
issue again in the National Assembly, which had replaced the Tanganyika
Legislative Council, Rashid Kawawa, who had replaced Nyerere as prime
minister, reiterated Nyerere’s earlier position in a three-point response.
He affirmed that: (i) no part of Lake Nyasa fell within German East Af-
rica; (ii) the boundary had not been altered by Great Britain after the
assumption of the League of Nations mandate; and (iii) whatever the dis-
advantages to Tanganyika, the government could not contemplate negotia-
tions with the authorities of the Central African Federation or Great
Britain.84 Rather, Prime Minister Kawawa concluded that if such negotia-
80. Id. at 614.
81. Id. Mayall merely reports the statement but fails to point out that this claim was
quite improbable given the location of the Kariba Dam, on the Zambia–Zimbabwe border,
relative to the alleged location of the flooding, a distance of well over 1,500 km.
82. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 614–15.
84. See Statement by Prime Minister Kawawa, quoted in MCEWEN, supra note 13, at
190. Formally known as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, comprising Southern
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tions were to take place, they would have to be with the future govern-
ment of a fully independent Nyasaland.85 It has taken fifty years, until the
recent resurgence of the dispute, for any kind of negotiations to be under-
taken through the ongoing mediation process.
As stated above, the lake boundary was first publicly disputed be-
tween the two neighbors from May 1967 to September 1968. While, as has
just been seen, questions about Tanzanian sovereignty over this part of the
lake had first been raised in 1961 in the Tanganyika Legislative Council, it
has correctly been noted that a dispute could not as such have existed until
after Malawi took a definite stand against the Tanzanian claim subsequent
to its independence in 1964.86 But, even then, there were no publicly ex-
pressed official positions on the matter by either party until May 1967. The
claimant then, as now, was Tanzania or the United Republic of Tanzania,
to give it its full official name. Tanzania had been created by the merger on
April 16, 1964, of the mainland Republic of Tanganyika and the neighbor-
ing archipelago of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, which won independence
from British rule on December 10, 1963.87
The evolution of the dispute can be summarized in the following se-
quence of events. In a Note Verbale dated January 3, 1967, Tanzania offi-
cially notified Malawi of its view that the boundary followed the median
line of the lake.88 The Government of Malawi responded on January 21,
1967 by simply acknowledging Tanzania’s Note Verbale and indicating that
a further reply would follow. No such reply was ever issued. Subsequently,
on May 31, 1967 President Julius Nyerere wrote to his Malawian counter-
part, Kamuzu Banda, advising that Tanzania rejected the eastern shoreline
boundary.89 There was no written response from President Banda, but in
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and Nyasaland; established on August
1, 1953 and dissolved on December 31, 1963.
85. Mayall, supra note 3, at 615–16 (stating that Chief Mhaiki apparently accepted that
under the 1890 Anglo–American Agreement the entire lake area fell within Nyasaland but
wanted the Government of the newly independent Tanganyika to take steps to remove the
disadvantages suffered by the people of Tanganyika living along the shore of the lake).
86. Brownlie, supra note 29, at 258.
87. The Sultanate of Zanzibar was a protectorate of the United Kingdom from 1890
(following the conclusion of the Anglo-German Treaty) until independence in 1963. The
merger with Tanganyika followed the overthrow, in a bloody revolution barely a month after
independence in January 1964, of the ruler Sultan Jamshid bin Abdullah and the Arab dy-
nasty, which had politically dominated the sultanate. The revolution was led by Abeid Amani
Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party, who also steered the merger with Tanganyika. See
Ethan R. Sanders, Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union in the Midst of the Cold War:
Internal and International Factors, 41 AFR. REV. 35, 35 (2014).
88. See N.V. No. FAC/B.70/8, Jan. 3, 1967 from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
United Republic of Tanzania to Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of Malawi, in
PARL. DEBATES, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, OFFICIAL REPORT, July 4, 1967, cols. 1311–12, Dar
es Salaam, Tanzania.
89. See Che-Mponda, supra note 57, at 175. On the same day, May 31, 1967, President
Nyerere for the first time publicly announced this new position in a speech at a school in
Iringa, in southwestern Tanzania; see THE NATIONALIST (June 1, 1967), as cited in Che-
Mponda, id.
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the course of an address to the Malawi Parliament on June 27, 1967, he
rejected Tanzania’s claim as having no justification and reasserted that the
lake had always belonged to Malawi.90 For the next one and a half years,
the two leaders continued to trade accusations of a personal nature that
went beyond the original issue of disputed sovereignty of the lake. Mean-
while, Malawi ordered the deployment of patrol boats and Tanzania or-
dered the building up of communications and small arms before tensions
died down and relations improved slightly towards the end of 1968.91
For the remaining period of President Banda’s rule, diplomatic rela-
tions between the two countries remained generally cool until 1985, when
a gradual thaw eventually led to the establishment of formal diplomatic
relations in that year. But, a full blossoming of relations only occurred
after Banda’s exit from power in 1994.
Until its resurgence in July 2012, improved relations following the re-
placement of Banda’s regime by the first democratically elected govern-
ment since the country’s independence seemed to have ushered in an
unprecedented entente between Malawi and Tanzania and appeared to
have consigned the dispute to the dustbin of history. 
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF BOUNDARIES AND STATE SUCCESSION TO
BOUNDARY TREATIES IN POST-COLONIAL
AFRICAN STATE PRACTICE
The importance attached by nations to territorial ownership needs lit-
tle demonstration or emphasis. It may be assumed that as the value of land
increases, the need for greater precision in determining the extent of one’s
territory becomes more apparent, and, when it is comparatively worthless
in economic terms, less attention need be paid to the establishment of pre-
cise boundaries. Yet, the Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India/Pakistan), re-
ferred to earlier, amply demonstrated, in McEwen’s words, that in reality
“even relatively useless territory may be the subject of, or an adjunct to,
international disagreement.”92
This was more recently validated by the dispute over a largely unpro-
ductive scrabble of land along the Eritrea-Ethiopia border that led to a
senseless two-year war starting in May 1998.93 Irrespective of the eco-
90. Lake Claim Rejected, MALAWI NEWS, June 30, 1967, at 1.
91. See Che-Mponda, supra note 57, at 162, 240; see also Mayall, supra note 3, at
619–20. The personal animus between Presidents Banda and Nyerere was no doubt fueled by
the former’s continuing suspicion that the latter was assisting former Malawian cabinet minis-
ters exiled in Tanzania to overthrow his government or at any rate that the Tanzanian govern-
ment was doing nothing to rein in their alleged subversive activities.
92. See MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 4.
93. The war over the disputed area of Badme was fought from May 1998 to June 2000
at the cost of hundreds of dollars and tens of thousands of casualties. Yet the conflict resulted
in minor border changes and the recommendations of the U.N. Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary
Commission have been ignored as Ethiopia continues to occupy the disputed territory. See
generally Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Reflections on the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Conflict, 23
FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 39 (1999).
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nomic worth of the territory in question, international boundaries allocate
territory to states and political units, which have an international status
and contribute to the identification of national sovereignty and identity.
Even neighboring states that enjoy the most amicable relations need to
know the location of their common border in order to facilitate the proper
application and enforcement of their respective laws. Thus, writing at the
turn of the last century, the British statesman Lord Curzon aptly observed
that:
[Boundaries] are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang sus-
pended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to na-
tions . . . Just as the protection of the home is the vital care of the
private citizen, so the integrity of her borders is the condition of
existence of the State.94
Boundaries, as Judge Huber impliedly noted in the Island of Palmas
case,95 mark the limits of state sovereignty and are themselves marked by
acceptance by members of the international community. Similarly, Mal-
colm Shaw has stated that:
The importance of boundaries is that they demarcate State juris-
dictions, and thus profoundly influence the regime, nationality,
and cultural milieu of the inhabitants of such areas. Accordingly,
the notion and existence of boundaries is closely allied with the
concept of territorial integrity and plays a symbolic as well as a
practical role.96
It goes without saying, therefore, that the protection of the inviolabil-
ity of boundaries has assumed an important role in the international sys-
tem.97 In Africa, as elsewhere, boundaries are “the definitive forms of
statehood, the sites of citizenship, and the arenas of development.”98
There is a commonly held view that for a boundary to be effective, it has
to be accepted by the states concerned. Unrecognized unilateral boundary
demarcations are likely to remain without international effect in the ab-
sence of acquiescence or recognition. It has thus been argued that the legal
force of a boundary may be said to derive either from a treaty, by virtue of
acquiescence, or recognition by the parties concerned.99 This view was un-
94. GEORGE NATHANIEL CURZON, FRONTIERS 7 (1907).
95. See Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
96. MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA 221 (1986).
97. The protection of the inviolability of boundaries ensures respect for the principle
of territorial integrity, which, in turn, underpins the decentralized state-oriented character of
the modern international system and reflects the sovereign equality of states enshrined as a
fundamental principle in Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1.
98. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Boundaries in Eastern Africa, 4 J. E. AFR. STUD. 266, 266
(2010).
99. SHAW, supra note 96, at 222.
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derscored by Judge Bebler in his dissenting opinion in the Rann of Kutch
Arbitration, where he stated that:
International boundaries have usually emerged by custom. They
have become gradually well determined by mutual acquiescence
and/or recognition by the neighbors concerned. [Mutual] acquies-
cence and mutual recognition are therefore the most general ori-
gin of existing international boundaries. Very many of them still
nowadays have no other legal foundation for their validity. Ex
facto jus exitur.100
This view is no doubt true with respect to the older, mainly European,
states that comprised the original members of the so-called international
community at the time. But, even these have also been the outcomes of
treaty arrangements over the centuries, ever since the Treaty of Westpha-
lia in 1648.
In the case of Africa, and in particular the modern post-colonial Afri-
can states, the origins of boundaries are located overwhelmingly in inter-
national treaties rather than in custom. Almost all African borders did not
emerge on the basis of prescription over a period of time, but are rather
the creation of European colonial treaties and arrangements.
The question of the validity and determination of these boundaries is,
therefore, connected with the status in law of the particular treaties speci-
fying such boundaries.101 This is not the place to engage in a detailed dis-
cussion of the legal status of boundaries in general. However, suffice it
merely to observe that the conclusion that emerges from the various schol-
arly writings on African boundaries by such diverse writers as Brownlie,102
Crawford,103 McEwen,104 and Shaw,105 among others, is that the search
for legal solutions to international boundary disputes among African
states must start with a factual and legal examination of the international
treaties establishing such boundaries.
Two particular questions immediately present themselves in this re-
gard. First, can it be argued that the demise of colonialism and the advent
of the principle of self-determination have resulted in a fundamental
change of circumstances as regards particular boundary treaties, thus ter-
minating the treaty or enabling a party or a successor to a party to the
treaty to terminate it? Second, in view of the dominant “clean slate” or
tabula rasa doctrine governing the succession of new states to the rights
and obligations of predecessor states, do such treaties lapse upon indepen-
100. 7 I.L.M. 698–99 (1968).
101. See SHAW, supra note 96, at 222.
102. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 22.
103. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 22.
104. See generally MCEWEN, supra note 13.
105. See generally SHAW, supra note 96, at 222.
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dence?106 These questions are implicated in the Malawi-Tanzania bound-
ary dispute.
The first question is concerned with the operation of the doctrine of
clausula rebus sic stantibus, that a party may unilaterally invoke as a
ground for terminating or suspending the operation of a treaty the fact
that there has been a fundamental change of circumstances from those
that existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty.107 This question
was raised by France in two cases before the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice: Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco case108 and Free
Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex.109 In both cases, the Court did
not proceed to consider the doctrine, because, on the facts, it was found to
be unnecessary and irrelevant. What is more important here, however, is
to note that the principle of rebus sic stantibus is now embodied in Article
62(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), which pro-
vides, in part, that “a fundamental change of circumstances [may] not be
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if
the treaty establishes a [boundary].”110 This provision was the product of a
long debate both within the International Law Commission and later in
the 1968 U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, which considered the
final text of the draft treaty that is now the 1969 Convention. The result is
now that a state cannot, for example, invoke the occurrence of indepen-
dence as a fundamental change of circumstances justifying the abrogation
of a pre-independence boundary treaty.
The other question concerns the operation of the doctrine of state suc-
cession. This was the subject of copious scholarly and political debates in
the 1960s and 1970s, especially in the context of the decolonization process
in Africa and Asia. These debates resurfaced briefly in the early 1990s in
the wake of the territorial fragmentation in central and Eastern Europe
that produced new states following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In
another discussion, I have noted that the post-independence practice of
106. See Tiyanjana Maluwa, Succession to Treaties in Post-Independence Africa: A Ret-
rospective Consideration of Some Theoretical and Practical Issues with Special Reference to
Malawi, 4 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 791, 800–02 (1992), for a more comprehensive discussion
of the practice of African states in this regard.
107. Clausula rebus sic stantibus (or simply rebus sic stantibus) is variously described in
the legal literature as a “legal doctrine” or a “general principle of law.” See Oliver J. Lis-
sitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 895
(1967); Gyo¨rgy Haraszti, Treaties and Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146 COL-
LECTED COURSES HAGUE ACAD. INT’L L. 1 (1975); Egon Schwelb, Fundamental Change of
Circumstances: Notes on Article 59 of the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties as Recom-
mended for Adoption to the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties by its Commit-
tee of the Whole in 1968, 29 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 39 (1969).
108. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Advisory Opin-
ion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 4 (Feb. 7).
109. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, (Fr. v. Switz.), Judgment, 1932
P.C.I.J (Ser. A/B) No. 46 (June 7).
110. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 62, ¶ 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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African states has been somewhat varied, but that, in any case, there has
been a general tendency among most African states to regard themselves
as being free to succeed to or opt out of certain treaties as a matter of
choice.111 The mechanisms employed by the new states have ranged from
unilateral declarations acknowledging or rejecting the devolution of pre-
independence treaties to the conclusion of inheritance or devolution
agreements with the departing colonial power transferring all (or some)
treaty rights and obligations to the successor state.112
On this matter, Malawi opted to follow what is termed the “Nyerere
Doctrine” of state succession, so named after the unilateral declaration
made in 1961 by the then Prime Minister of newly independent Tangany-
ika in a letter to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations
which read, in part:
As regards bilateral treaties validly concluded by the Government
of the United Kingdom on behalf of the territory of Tanganyika,
or validly applied or extended by the former to the territory of the
latter, the Government of Tanganyika is willing to continue to ap-
ply within its territory on a basis of reciprocity, the terms of all
such treaties for a period of two years from the date of indepen-
dence (i.e. until 8 December, 1963) unless abrogated or modified
by earlier mutual consent. At the expiry of that period, the Gov-
ernment of Tanganyika will regard such of these treaties which
could not by application of the rules of customary international
law be regarded as otherwise surviving, as having terminated.113
Malawi’s declaration, made on November 24, 1964, followed verbatim
Tanganyika’s, except that it shortened the transitional period by six
months, stating in part that:
As regards bilateral treaties validly concluded by the Government
of the United Kingdom or the Government of the former Federa-
tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on behalf of the former Nyasa-
land Protectorate, or validly applied or extended by either of the
said Governments to the territory of the former Nyasaland Pro-
tectorate, the Government of Malawi is willing to continue to ap-
111. See Maluwa, supra note 106, at 802–07.
112. See Int’l Law Ass’n, State Succession, in REPORT OF FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE
557 (1966). The classic example of a unilateral declaration as a mechanism for succession to
treaties by a newly independent state is the announcement by Malawi, in a letter from Prime
Minister H. Kamuzu Banda to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, notifying him of
the category of pre-independence treaties signed by the United Kingdom, the erstwhile colo-
nial power, to which it considered itself bound for a stipulated period and under specified
conditions. See Letter from H. Kamuzu Banda, infra note 114.
113. Earle E. Seaton & Sosthenes T. Maliti, Treaties and Succession of States and Gov-
ernment in Tanzania 76–98 (1967) (unpublished paper presented at African Conference on
International Law and African Problems held in Lagos, Nigeria, Mar. 14–18, 1967) (on file
with author). For an extended discussion of Tanzania’s approach to treaty succession, see
Earle E. Seaton & Sosthenes T. Maliti, TANZANIA TREATY PRACTICE (1973).
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ply within its territory on a basis of reciprocity, the terms of all
such treaties for a period of eighteen months from the date of
independence (i.e. until 6 January, 1966) unless abrogated or mod-
ified by earlier mutual consent. At the expiry of that period, the
Government of Malawi will regard such of these treaties which
could not by application of the rules of customary international
law be regarded as otherwise surviving, as having terminated.114
In essence this doctrine is really no more than a vague or general recogni-
tion that certain unspecified treaties do survive as a result of the applica-
tion of the rules of customary law, coupled with an offer of a grace period
in which treaties remain in force on an interim basis without prejudice to
the declarant’s legal position with a requirement of reciprocity.115
The view that a new state starts life with a clean slate and is thus not
bound to succeed to pre-independence treaties except those establishing
boundaries finds support in the Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties (1978).116 Article 16 provides that a newly
independent state is not bound to maintain in force or to become a party
to, any treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of succession of
states the treaty was in force in respect of the territory to which the succes-
sion of states relates. However, Article 11 makes an exception for bound-
ary regimes by providing that, “a succession of states does not as such
affect: (a) a boundary established by a treaty; or (b) obligations and rights
established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary.”
In adopting this position, the Convention was, in effect, both accepting
the clean–slate theory of state succession over the competing absolute
devolution theory and acknowledging boundary treaties as an exception to
this general rule of non-devolution. In so doing, the Convention has fol-
lowed the view propounded earlier by most writers, including those who
generally advocated the clean-slate theory, namely that boundary treaties
devolve upon successor states despite a change of sovereignty.117 The ra-
tionale behind this view is not hard to find: it is predicated on the need to
maintain the stability and continuity of boundaries as an essential condi-
114. Letter from H. Kamuzu Banda, Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs,
to The Secretary General of the United Nations, reprinted in Int’l L. Ass’n, THE EFFECT OF
INDEPENDENCE ON TREATIES 388 (1965).
115. In his excellent discussion of the subject, Makonnen characterizes the “Nyerere
Doctrine” and its variants as together constituting “the eastern African optional doctrine of
State succession.” YILMA MAKONNEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW STATES OF AF-
RICA 197–259 (1983); see also YILMA MAKONNEN, THE NYERERE DOCTRINE OF STATE SUC-
CESSION AND THE NEW STATES OF EAST AFRICA (1984).
116. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, Aug. 23,
1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Nov. 6, 1996).
117. See, e.g., ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES, 656 (1961); A. P. Lester,
State Succession to Treaties in the Commonwealth, 12 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 475, 488 (1963); D.
P. O’Connell, Independence and Succession to Treaties, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 84 (1962). For
one commentator’s view on African practice, see N. S. Rembe, The Vienna Convention on
State Succession in Respect of Treaties: An African Perspective on its Applicability and Limita-
tion, 17 COMP. & INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 131, 140–41 (1984).
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tion for the coexistence of the various sovereign independent polities that
comprise the international community. This essential condition, and basic
reality, is encapsulated in the recognized principle of respect for the terri-
torial integrity of states, even in circumstances where the origins of the
borders may lie in the arbitrary acts and decisions of colonial administra-
tors and cartographers of a past colonial era.118 And practice reveals that,
in general, states have accepted the principle of succession to boundary
settlements embodied in treaties. Probably the most famous expression of
this view, in the African context, is the Resolution on Border Disputes
Among African States adopted by the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) at its first ordinary summit in Cairo, Egypt, in July 1964.119 A brief
discussion of this historic resolution, whose adoption remains central to
the question of the legitimacy of African boundaries in the post-indepen-
dence era, would be in order.
A. The OAU’s Resolution Concerning Boundaries:
The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris
Prior to 1960, most of the political parties or movements fighting for
the independence of the various African colonies advocated for an even-
tual alteration of the existing colonial boundaries to accord more closely
with the wishes of local inhabitants. Indeed, “[t]he All-African Peoples
Conference, held under the stewardship of Kwame Nkrumah in Accra,
Ghana, in December 1958, adopted a resolution calling for an early aboli-
tion and alteration of existing boundaries,” as a preliminary step towards
the declared objective of creating a united Africa.120 But, this resolution
was passed at a time when only a handful of African states had obtained
independence and a modification of this attitude was soon to be displayed
at the first international conference of independent African states, which
led to the establishment of the OAU, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in
May 1963. Here, “[t]he vast majority of delegates took the view that
whatever might be the moral and historical argument for a readjustment
of national boundaries, any practical attempts to reshape them might well
prove to be disastrous.”121 This sentiment was quite apparent in the vari-
ous delegates’ speeches. Thus, the President of the Malagasy Republic
noted:
118. SHAW, supra note 96, at 233–34.
119. Org. of African Unity [OAU], Border Disputes Among African States, AHG/Res.
16(I) (July 17–21, 1964), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-res-16-i-en.pdf. Cf. Org. of Af-
rican Unity [OAU], Resolution on Peace and Security in Africa Through Reservation by
Somalia Negotiated Settlement of Border Conflicts, CM/Res. 1069 (XLIV) (July 21–26, 1986),
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/cm-res-1069-xliv-e.pdf (adopted over two decades later and
enshrining the principle of peaceful settlement of border conflicts between states through
negotiations).
120. MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 23.
121. Id. at 24. See also Modibo Keita, Address delivered at the Summit Conference of
Independent African States CIAS/GEN/INF/33, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUMMIT CONFER-
ENCE OF INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES, Sec. 2, (May 1963) [hereinafter Modibo Keita
Address].
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[I] am not unaware that, when our colonizers set boundaries be-
tween territories, they too often ignored the frontiers of race, lan-
guage and ethnicities. [It] is no longer possible, nor desirable, to
modify the boundaries of nations, on the pretext of racial, relig-
ious, or linguistic criteria. [Indeed] should we take race, religion
or language as criteria for setting our boundaries, a few States in
Africa would be blotted out from the map.122
A more poignant note was struck by the President of Mali, Modibo Keita,
who stated:
[We] must take Africa as it is, and we must renounce any territo-
rial claims, if we do not wish to introduce what we might call black
imperialism in Africa. [African] unity demands of each one of us
complete respect for the legacy that we have received from the
colonial system, that is to say: maintenance of the present fron-
tiers of our respective States. [If] we desire that our nations should
be ethnic, speaking the same language and having the same psy-
chology, then we shall find no single veritable nation in Africa.123
The near consensus that arose from these debates was subsequently
given expression in the resolution adopted by the Cairo summit referred
to above. After noting that “the borders of African States, at indepen-
dence, constituted a tangible reality,” the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government went on solemnly to “[declare] that all Member States pledge
themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of na-
tional independence.”124 It is apt to note here that it was, in fact, President
Nyerere who first proposed and introduced the resolution to retain the
colonial boundaries at the Cairo summit.125 The adoption of the resolution
was a reaffirmation of the principle already enshrined in Article III of the
Charter of the OAU, adopted in Addis Ababa on May 25, 1963, by which
the Member States affirmed and declared their adherence to “[r]espect for
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable
right to independent existence.”126 This principle has been replicated
more clearly in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which super-
seded the OAU Charter when it entered into force on May 26, 2001. Arti-
cle 4(b) provides for, as one of the AU’s foundational principles, “respect
of borders existing on achievement of independence.”127 This provision
122. See Modibo Keita Address, supra note 121.
123. Id.
124. Org. of African Unity [OAU], Border Disputes Among African States, AHG/Res.
16(I), operative ¶ 2 (July 17–21, 1964), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-res-16-i-en.pdf.
125. See GOFDREY MWAKIKAGILE, NYERERE AND AFRICA: END OF AN ERA 355
(2007).
126. Org. of African Unity [OAU] Charter art. 3, ¶ 2, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/
files/OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf.
127. African Union [AU], Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 4(b), http://www
.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Constitutive_Act_en_0.htm.
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establishes a binding treaty obligation upon Malawi and Tanzania, as they
are both parties to the Act.
The colonial partition of Africa following the Berlin Conference intro-
duced the Westphalian model of territoriality and statehood across the
continent. Largely eviscerating the colonial project, this model replaced
and reconfigured pre–existing African centralized states, kingdoms, and
stateless communities. One of the enduring legacies of colonialism was
that it left the African continent with borders that were drawn by Euro-
pean powers, based on their limited and, in some cases, non-existent
knowledge of the precolonial history, ethnicity, and geography of Africa.
The project of nation-building in the post-colonial period, as evident in the
statements quoted above, did not seek to challenge the colonially created
territorial entities. Rather, the core of this enterprise has entailed the con-
solidation and domestication of the borders inherited from colonialism, a
process that was formally validated by the leaders of the newly indepen-
dent African states at the Cairo summit in 1964.128 This may seem utterly
unconscionable to today’s critics of the imperial international law that was
employed to justify the dismemberment of African communities in the ser-
vice of colonialism.129 But, the nationalists and political leaders who both
led the fight for independence and championed the idea of a united Africa
had to deal with the undesirable but “tangible reality” of the inherited
colonial boundaries and accept that jettisoning these boundaries in favor
of redrawing the political map and territorial division of the continent was
not a viable proposition.
Mutua has offered one of the most powerful critiques of present-day
African borders. He questions the legitimacy of the post-colonial African
state and attacks the imperial cartography that delineated the borders that
produced these states.130 He also questions the logic and sincerity of the
OAU Cairo summit decision to keep colonial boundaries as they stood at
independence.131 Mutua argues that these inherited borders are an im-
posed identity that bequeathed to Africa a legacy of false statehood and
contrived citizenry, and advocates for the abandonment of the principle of
uti possidetis.132 Yet, Mutua’s own proposal to redraw the map of Africa to
reduce the current fifty-odd continental states to a mere thirteen is itself
open to criticism. For the boundaries of his proposed states are themselves
drawn on the basis of criteria that do not entirely escape the charge of
128. See Modibo Keita Address, supra note 121.
129. See generally Makau Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal
Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1113 (1995).
130. Id. at 1116, 1142–50.
131. Id. at 1164.
132. Id. at 1142–47, 1175. Cf. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEM-
PORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996). He posits a different
critique of the African postcolonial state. One of his central arguments is that the problem is
not the post-colonial borders, but the colonial administrative legacy within those borders that
is impeding the modern African state. He focuses on the obstacles to democracy posed by the
structure of the postcolonial state.
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arbitrariness directed at colonial-era boundary-making. In some respects,
Mutua’s redrawn map of Africa similarly cuts across demography, topog-
raphy, and ethnicity in a manner that would replicate, rather than elimi-
nate, the legacy of colonial borders.133 But this is a minor quibble, and his
proposed redrawn map could be read as a parody of colonial cartography.
There can be no doubt that Mutua’s critique of the (territorial) identity of
the post-colonial African state has injected a refreshing and original tone
into the discourse on African borders and boundary studies, as part of the
wider debates about post-coloniality and critical approaches to interna-
tional law.
The OAU resolution of 1964 is sometimes interpreted as, indeed
equated with, the principle of uti possidetis, which is derived from Roman
law. Under Roman law, uti possidetis was one of the Praetorian possessory
interdicts; in essence, a prohibition by the Praetor against interference
with the possession of immovable property, with the purpose of deciding
which of the rival claimants should be placed in possession, and thereby
occupy the favored position of defendant in the actio vindicatio.134 This
Roman law principle was analogically imported into international law by
Latin American states in the nineteenth century, for the purpose of regu-
lating the boundary cases that arose among the newly independent states
following the collapse of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires in
South and Central America.135
The objective behind the application of the principle to the new states
was to transform previously internal administrative provincial boundaries
(in the case of the Spanish colonies) as they stood at the time of indepen-
dence into stable international boundaries. The contemporary usage of the
principle—often loosely translated as “keep what you have”—in modern
international law is quite different from its original Roman law context.
For, whereas in Roman law uti possidetis was the award of interim posses-
sion, as a preliminary step to the establishment of ownership, in its modern
formulation, it is understood as an attempt at consolidating and affirming
state sovereignty over inherited and existing territorial boundaries. At
least this is the sense in which the OAU resolution is generally interpreted.
In fact, it is for this reason, and with this meaning in mind, that uti pos-
sidetis has come to be regarded by some commentators as an expression of
a rule of regional international law among African states.136
133. Mutua, supra note 129, at 1117 (proposing a redrawn African map with thirteen
reconfigured and renamed states as follows: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Kusini, Libya, Mali, Nubia, Sahara, and Somalia).
134. See H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 273–74 (1952); BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN
LAW 63, 100, 125 (1962). See also Enver Hasani, International Law under Fire: Uti Possidetis
from Rome to Kosovo, 27 FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 85 (2003).
135. Antonio T. Serra, History of the Law of Nations, Regional Developments: Latin
America, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. 7, 231, 234 (Rudolf Bern-
hardt ed., 1984).
136. See, e.g., GINO J. NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: AN ANALYSIS
OF ITS ROLE 9–11 (1989). It is also instructive to note that the principle of uti possidetis was
384 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:351
But, of course, whether one accepts or rejects this notion of uti pos-
sidetis, or even its alleged status as a principle of international law, the
reality is that boundary disputes have not ceased to exist or arise between
African states. What is clear in all these disputes is that, by and large, the
issues turn not so much on a rejection of the general principles of interna-
tional law discussed in this essay, but on the factual interpretation or con-
struction of the actual boundary treaties in question. In some cases, there
may well be two or more treaties or agreements that are regarded by the
different parties concerned as awarding the same territory to the opposing
claimants. In other cases, the problem may arise as a result of an apparent
conflict or uncertainty in the interpretation of a single boundary treaty or
agreement. The crux of the present dispute, however, follows neither of
these scenarios. Rather, it turns (1) on the claim by one party that the
location of the boundary as stipulated in the critical treaty—whose sole
relevance to the dispute is not disputed—is not in conformity with estab-
lished international norms and is, for that reason, unfair, inequitable, and
unjust, and (2) a rejection of that position by the other party and the argu-
ment that, on the contrary, the departure from the international norm in
Article I(2) of the Agreement of 1890 is a permissible treaty variation, and
that the adoption of uti possidetis as a treaty obligation in the AU Consti-
tutive Act enjoins both parties to respect the inherited boundary.
B. The Determination of Boundaries in Contiguous Lakes and
Sovereignty over Islands
The question of where the exact boundary line is to be located in the
case of contiguous lakes that separate the territories of two or more states
is closely linked to two other pertinent issues in international law. The first
relates to the determination of the rights of the riparian states in respect of
such lakes. The second concerns the attribution of sovereignty over islands
located in the lake. This question arises here in relation to three small
uninhabited islands located close to the Tanzanian shore: Lundu, Papia,
and Ngkuko (or Ngkoko), the largest of which is only 70 acres.137 In real-
ity both questions are connected to the larger question of the right to the
management and exploitation or utilization of resources located in or
under shared international watercourses (rivers, lakes, and land-locked
discussed by the International Court of Justice in the Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v.
Mali) where the Court had to delimit the common frontier between Burkina Faso and Mali.
Both parties specifically requested the Court to take into account the principle of the inviola-
bility of colonial boundaries enshrined in the OAU resolution quoted above; the Court rec-
ognized the importance of the principle not only to the parties, but to African states as a
whole, and declared that the principle was now one of universal application. Frontier Dispute
Case (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 554 at 565. But see Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a
Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 590, 600 (1996)
(providing a different view of uti possidetis, stating: “[It] is not a norm of jus cogens, and
precludes states neither from altering their borders nor even from creating new states by
mutual consent”).
137. See HIRAN JAYEWARDENE, THE REGIME OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
248–49 (1990); see also MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 197–99.
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seas). Under general international law, the determination of contiguous
lake or river boundaries is dependent upon the characterization of the par-
ticular lake or river as navigable or non-navigable. This characterization
determines, in turn, the choice of the thalweg, or the line defining the
deepest points along the length of a waterway, or the medium filum aquae
as the line of delimitation down the lake or river. However, states are at
liberty to depart from this general presumption by providing for specific
arrangements relating to the location of a lake or river boundary. A treaty
may provide, for example, that the boundary between two adjacent ripa-
rian states should be placed along one of the lake shores or river banks,
thereby attributing exclusive territorial sovereignty over the entire lake or
river to one of the two states.138 Or a treaty may provide that sovereignty
over an island located in a boundary lake or river should be awarded to
one state or the other even while adopting the thalweg or median line as
the boundary.139 Brownlie cites Oppenheim’s view on this point in his dis-
cussion of the earlier iteration of the current boundary dispute finding
that:
There is a great deal of authority and practice in support of the
view that the boundary line runs through the middle of boundary
lakes and land-locked seas unless a treaty provides otherwise or a
lake has a definite “thalweg” or mid-channel. The middle line has
considerations of equity, stability and simplicity in its favor.140
Some legal scholars’ writing more recently has supported this view,
but with some qualification. Thus, for example, Vinogradov and Wouters
note that:
The rules governing the delimitation (and demarcation) of the
boundaries of an international lake are not universally accepted.
Although State practice has varied on this issue, the prevailing
view is that all States bordering an international lake are entitled
to a share of it . . . . In the case of contiguous lakes, the respective
parts are generally determined through the use of a median line,
but there have been significant exceptions to this rule . . . .
[In] summary, the delimitation of international lakes is not at
present governed by an established set of rules, nor are there uni-
138. E.g., The French–Liberian Agreement of Jan. 13, 1911 relating to the Makona
River on the Guinea-Liberia boundary, in International Boundary Study No. 131 (Guinea-
Liberia Boundary), Off. Geographer (1972).
139. See e.g., Treaty of the Rio de la Plata and its Maritime Limit art. I(A), Arg.–Uru.,
Apr. 7, 1961, 635 U.N.T.S. 98. See also discussion in Part I(A) regarding the incorporation of
Likoma and Chizumulu Islands into the Nyasaland Protectorate under various United King-
dom–Portugal treaties, supra notes 38–41.
140. Brownlie, supra note 29, at 271 (citing 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
TREATISE 533 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed., 1963)).
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versally accepted customary norms based on uniform State
practice.141
Lee also advances the view that shared ownership of an international lake
is not automatic unless specified by a treaty, as the legal regimes of lakes
are based on specific agreements.142 This contrasts with the position of
Oppenheim and Brownlie, as indicated above.
Because the thalweg is a term used to refer to the main navigable
channel, it has more relevance in navigable boundary rivers where the
main navigable channel may not coincide with the median line. The
thalweg is unlikely to be an issue in large lakes, such as Lake Malawi, with
several navigation channels and no definite mid-channel.143 The presump-
tion in international law that the international boundary in contiguous
lakes follows the median line was seemingly reflected in, or coincided
with, some sections of popular opinion in Tanzania in the period immedi-
ately preceding and following the attainment of independence. Chief
Mhaiki’s repeated motions in the Tanganyika Legislative Council in Octo-
ber 1960 and in the National Assembly in June 1962 reflected a popular
sentiment, at least among people in the Songea district adjoining the lake,
which McEwen has captured in the imaginary and somewhat rhetorical
question: “Why, it is asked, were other great African lakes, such as Victo-
ria, Tanganyika, Albert, and Edward, divided, more or less equally, be-
tween neighboring states, while Nyasa alone forms the exception?”144
International boundaries that follow the shores of lakes are rare.145
One of the most obvious problems created by shoreline boundaries, as was
noted by an early writer on this subject decades ago, is that they leave the
other riparian state with no control over its water frontage and no right to
build wharves or breakwater in the lake.146 Another obvious problem is
the difficulty that may be experienced in identifying the precise location of
the boundary. In tidal lakes the shore is commonly understood as the land
lying between the lines of high and low water. By their nature, even non-
tidal lakes usually experience periodic rise and fall of water levels, which
141. Sergi Vinogradov & Patricia Wouters, The Caspian Sea: Current Legal Problems,
55 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 604, 615 (1995).
142. Yusin Lee, Towards a New International Regime for the Caspian Sea, 52 PROBS.
POST–COMMUNISM 37, 39 (2005).
143. Most of the literature tends to treat “thalweg” and “mid-channel” as synonymous
terms. But as was shown in the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v Namib.),
which concerned a disputed boundary also governed by the same Anglo–German Treaty of
1890, there was interpretive ambiguity as to whether the terms specified in Article III(2),
“centre of the main channel” in the English version and “thalweg” in the German, meant the
same thing. See Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v Namib.), Judgment, 1999,
I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶ 15 (Dec. 13) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
144. MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 200.
145. Id. at 201; S. WHITTEMORE BOGGS, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES: A STUDY OF
BOUNDARY FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS 177 & n.3 (1940).
146. STEPHEN B. JONES, BOUNDARY MAKING: A HANDBOOK FOR STATESMEN, TREATY
EDITORS, AND BOUNDARY COMMISSIONERS 141 (1945).
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necessarily affect the precise location of the water’s edge. Thus, in bound-
ary lakes, the shifting shoreline will likely produce unequal territorial ef-
fects on the riparian states, depending on the slope and the geological
formation of the respective banks.147 This could be of considerable signifi-
cance where islands are located in shoal waters and in close proximity to
the shore, as is the case with the three islands mentioned above: Lundu,
Papia, and Ngkuko.
It has been noted that where a lake shore forms an international
boundary, one state has sovereignty over the waters of the lake to the
exclusion of the other. This seems logical enough.148 Consequently, the
state having sovereignty over the waters of the lake will also have sover-
eignty over the islands in the lake, as they lie on its side of the boundary,
unless otherwise provided by a boundary settlement. This would appear to
be the situation created by the 1890 Agreement since, as already noted,
the boundary established incorporated the three islands into the Nyasa-
land protectorate, despite the fact that they lie at distances ranging from
only one-quarter to one-and-a-half miles of the Tanzanian shore.149
There is some uncertainty about the history surrounding their pre-
sumed attribution to the British sphere of influence in the 1890 Agree-
ment and their current status. McEwen has suggested that, because of
their small size, these islands were probably unknown to the British and
German authorities when the Anglo–German Treaty was negotiated and
that, in any case, a strict interpretation of the treaty would suggest that
they did not fall within the German sphere of influence and have thus
never been part of Tanzania.150 On the other hand, Brownlie has asserted
that “[t]here was, for example, German control and administration of the
small islands: Lundu, Papia and Ngkoyo,”151 but does not cite any authori-
tative historical evidence for this view.
Probably because of their size, the islands do not appear to have ever
been inhabited or occupied for any significant period of time, except possi-
bly for occasional use as resting stations by local fishermen. There are sug-
gestions that, in this context, historically Tanzania appears to have had
closer links with the islands because of their proximity, and that Malawi
may have acquiesced in the Tanzanian claim since it has not formally
claimed the islands nor disputed Tanzania’s claim.152 But, the argument
that Malawi may have acquiesced in Tanzania’s claim by not formally
claiming the islands for itself seems odd. From its point of view, Malawi
has no need to formally claim sovereignty over islands that are, in terms of
the 1890 Agreement, already part of its territory.
147. Id. at 138; MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 100.
148. See JAYEWARDENE, supra note 137.
149. Id.
150. See MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 197–99.
151. See BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 966.
152. See MCEWEN, supra note 13, at 198.
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In any case, assuming the shoreline boundary were to remain un-
changed, but sovereignty over the islands were granted to Tanzania
through negotiations or by arbitral or judicial settlement, the islands
would become Tanzanian enclaves within Malawian territorial waters. On
the other hand, if the boundary were changed to the median line in accor-
dance with Tanzania’s claim while sovereignty over the islands remained
unchanged, this would result in an enclave solution in favor of Malawi, in
much the same way that Likoma and Chizumulu Islands are Malawian
territories within Mozambican waters. Considerations of equity, not pre-
sumptions of acquiescence or estoppel, would favor the former option, if
only because of the historically closer association of the islands with
Tanzania and their relationship to local communities.
Another suggestion is that the British and German colonizers, bound-
ary delimiters, and map makers may not have been aware of the existence
of these small islands at the time of the conclusion of the 1890 Agreement
confirms two commonly held views prevalent during the era of coloniza-
tion of Africa.153 The first was the idea of Africa as a dark, unknown con-
tinent whose territory was fair game for European colonization even when
the colonizer had limited or no knowledge of the extent of the territory
being colonized. The second was the denial of agency to the native Afri-
cans and the non-recognition of their title to the territories being acquired
under the prevailing imperial international law.154 These two ideas under-
pinned the dubious European claim that, for the most part, the African
territories were terra nullius, and that use and occupation by the local Af-
rican populations did not create a legal title and thus presented no obsta-
cle to their acquisition by European states, as discussed in Part I(A)
above.155 In this colonial project, what mattered was the subjective inten-
tion by a colonizing European state to own the territory and exercise sov-
ereignty over it in total disregard of the presence of African people on the
territory. To the extent that the native Africans belonged to a state, it was
the new colonial entity constituted by the European state on the Westpha-
lian model. This process, which essentially denied African peoples their
autonomy and dignity, was given legal expression through the treaties es-
tablishing broadly defined spheres of influence, such as the 1890 Agree-
ment, or boundary treaties that more definitively marked out the extent of
the newly acquired territories. In his insightful commentary, apposite to
this discussion, Gathii has argued that, in cases involving territorial dis-
putes between African states, Africa has been treated with geographical
Hegelianism, as an unhistorical and unconscious geographical entity that
153. James Thuo Gathii, Geographical Hegelianism in Territorial Disputes Involving
Non-European Land Relations: An Analysis of the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Botswana v. Namibia), 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 581, 583–84, 595 (2002) (quoting Patrick
Brantlinger, Victorians and Africans: Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent, in P.
BRANTLINGER, RULE OF DARKNESS: BRITISH LITERATURE AND IMPERIALISM, 1830–1914, at
173 (1988)).
154. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 364–69.
155. Id.
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the colonizing states opened up to commerce and civilization, denying the
African communities the right to assert title to their own territories.156
The confirmation of the uti possidetis principle in both the 1964 OAU
Cairo Declaration and Article 4(b) of the AU Constitutive Act, as well as
its acceptance by the ICJ in such cases as the Frontier Dispute Case
(Burkina Faso v Mali) and the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Botswana v Namibia), is predicated on this notion of geographical Hege-
lianism. In both of these cases, the Court followed the logic of the princi-
ple of uti possidetis by refusing to alter the boundaries as they were
established in the relevant colonial-era treaties, although it did not explic-
itly rely on the principle as grounds for the decisions.157
While not bound by the doctrine of judicial precedent, it is inconceiv-
able that, if the current dispute came before it, the ICJ would opt not to
follow its approach in these previous cases. On the other hand, how the
Court would address the matter if Tanzania’s claim over the three islands
formed a core part of its case can only be a matter for conjecture. Unlike
the Kasikili–Sedudu Island situation, aspects of which are discussed below,
Tanzania’s case would not be based on the claim of continuous, or even
periodic, use and occupation of the islands by any community on its side.
The issue here would not be because there is a lack of settled occupation,
evidenced by such indicia as settled housing or ordered agriculture, in a
manner “known to Western jurisprudence and tradition,” to borrow from
Judge Weeramantry’s dictum in the Kasikili–Sedudu Island case,158 but
rather it would be the difficulty Tanzania would have in overcoming
Malawi’s superior legal claim, based on a treaty provision that enclosed
the apparently unknown islands within its territory. For it was long ago
accepted in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v. Nor-
way) that even slender proof of occupation may satisfy a court of the exer-
cise of sovereign rights in cases of thinly populated or unsettled territory,
but only where the other party cannot make out a superior claim.159 More-
over, even if it is the case that Malawi has never occupied the islands nor
shown effective control of them—the test famously enunciated by Arbitra-
tor Huber in the Island of Palmas Case (United States v. The Nether-
lands)—it is also acknowledged that the requirement of effective control
applies differently for inhabited as opposed to uninhabited territories, and
between accessible and inaccessible regions. As Arbitrator Huber stated,
in part, “apart from the consideration that the manifestations of sover-
156. Gathii, supra note 153, at 581, 582, 606, 613, 615–20.
157. In another case, Frontier Dispute Case (Benin v. Niger), the Court applied the prin-
ciple because in their Special Agreement referring the dispute to the Court, both parties had
stated that “they are in agreement on the relevance of the principle of uti possidetis juris for
the purposes of determining their common border.” Frontier Dispute Case (Benin v. Niger),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 90 ¶ 23 (July 2005).
158. Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, ¶
32 (Dec. 13).
159. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53
(Apr. 5).
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eignty over a small and distant island . . . cannot be expected to be fre-
quent, it is not necessary that the display of sovereignty should go back to
a very far distant period.”160
The absence of effective control or occupation of the three islands by
Malawi is thus of no consequence and does not diminish Malawi’s legal
title to them.
C. Foibles, Failures, and Lapses in Colonial Boundary Demarcation
Many countries are characterized by natural features such as rivers,
lakes, or the watershed of a mountain range as their international bounda-
ries. The reason is obvious: as boundaries, such natural features are often
regarded as self-demarcating, and, even if imperfectly explored and
mapped, they appear to offer themselves as physical landmarks the geo-
graphical identity of which is beyond doubt.161 However, it has been cau-
tioned that the adoption of natural boundaries may be ill advised unless
the delimitation instrument makes it clear which feature is intended and
precisely where in that feature the line must be drawn.162 Moreover, as
discussed above, borders defined by geographical features, such as rivers
and watersheds, or lake shores, are susceptible to shifting due to fluctuat-
ing water levels.163
The Lake Malawi boundary dispute is in part a reflection of the errors,
ambiguities, and uncertainties that attended colonial boundary-making
that supposedly followed self-demarcating physical features. In this re-
spect, the work of the Mixed Commission of 1898 comes to mind. Of this,
Donaldson has commented that the boundary commission [of 1898] de-
lineating this colonial border placed emphasis on the use of natural fea-
tures, with the exception of a 29-mile section out of the 250-mile
boundary. He further observed that the predominance of natural features
allowed the commission to use only twenty-three pillars as markers along
this entire boundary.164 Okumu, following Donaldson, suggested that co-
lonial-era boundary delimitation preferred natural features, such as
streams and rivers, simply because they required fewer boundary pil-
lars.165 He has argued that the choice of natural features also made the
160. See Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 867 (1928).
161. See A. O. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 19–22 (1967) (discussing boundaries in mountain ranges, swamps, watercourses,
etc.).
162. See A. C. McEwen, The Demarcation and Maintenance of International Boundaries
2 (2002) (paper prepared for the Canadian Commissioner of the Canada-United States Inter-
national Boundary Commission and presented at the July 8–10, 2002 Training Workshop on
the Demarcation and Maintenance of International Boundaries) (on file at the University of
Durham); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 4.
163. See Yoon, supra note 31, at 78.
164. John W. Donaldson, Pillars and Perspective: Demarcation of the Belgian Congo-
Northern Rhodesia Boundary, 34 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 471, 485 (2008).
165. Wafula Okumu, Resources and Border Disputes in Eastern Africa, 4 J. E. AFR.
STUD. 279, 286 (2010).
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work of boundary demarcation commissions easier and speedier. In his
reading, expediency and cost were thus critical factors in such demarca-
tions.166 It is widely accepted that, for the most part, demarcation of Afri-
can colonial territories remained an uncompleted task. A further challenge
was the fact that, as various writers have noted, boundaries had to be de-
limited in the absence of any real knowledge of what existed on the
ground: in most cases borders were drawn by government representatives
based in metropolitan capitals with little or no geographical knowledge of
the territories concerned.167 Moreover, colonial officials might have also
been reluctant to undertake complete demarcation in remote and inacces-
sible areas in which boundary pillars often stood the risk of destruction by
local populations. Khadiagala has aptly summarized the context of colo-
nial boundary-making.168 Although the following observations concern
colonial patterns of boundary-making in East Africa, they have a wider
relevance for the rest of Africa. According to Khadiagala:
This process followed a sequence whereby boundaries were de-
fined on maps, delimited by treaties, and demarcated on the
ground by colonial officials. Most of these boundaries were delim-
ited between 1884 and 1910, and starting in the 1920s, colonial
powers made attempts at demarcation, a process that has not en-
ded . . . .
After the juridical delimitation, the colonial powers con-
fronted the challenge of demarcation on the ground and the estab-
lishment of administrative structures that furnished meaning to
these acquisitions.169
An earlier commentary by Kapil on the potential for disputes over
Africa’s inherited colonial boundaries also bears reproducing here:
It is obvious that in the absence of demarcation and, more impor-
tant, of administration, any boundary will remain simply a mute
symbol of legal title on maps and documents, possessing no rele-
vance to the life of the zone it bisects . . . . Because of the time gap
between formal delimitation of jurisdictional limits and the taking
effect of political-administrative consequences of this jurisdiction,
most of the inherited boundaries of Africa can be said to have
166. Id.
167. See generally Adekunle Ajala, The Nature of African Boundaries, 18 AFR. SPEC-
TRUM 177, 180 (1983); see also Peter Collier, The Colonial Survey Committee and Mapping
of Africa (2006) (paper presented at the International Symposium on “Old-New Worlds”:
The History of Colonial Cartography, 1750–1950, at Utrecht University, The Netherlands,
Aug. 21–23, 2006), http://www.icahistcarto.org/PDF/Collier_Peter_-_The_Colonial_Survey_
Committee.pdf.; BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 6; Ieuan Griffiths, The Scramble for Africa:
Inherited Political Boundaries, 152 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 204, 205 (1986).
168. See generally Khadiagala, supra note 98.
169. Id. at 267–68.
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been operationally nonexistent for the major portion of their
history.170
Four decades after Kapil’s telling observation, the African Union finally
established a mechanism to address the problem of the absence of and
incomplete boundary demarcations in Africa. At its eleventh ordinary ses-
sion, held in Accra from June 25–29 of 2007, the AU Executive Council
adopted a decision to establish an African Union Border Program
(AUBP). The decision, which was an endorsement of a declaration
adopted earlier by the first ever Conference of African Ministers in
Charge of Border Issues, held in Addis Ababa on June 7, 2007, was itself
endorsed by the eighth ordinary session of the AU Assembly, also meeting
in Accra, on June 30–31 of 2007. One of the objectives, indeed the primary
one, of the AUBP is to support and facilitate the delimitation and demar-
cation of African boundaries where such exercise has not taken place.171
In the case of the disputed Lake Malawi boundary, it is highly plausi-
ble that the colonial boundary demarcation officials made the assumption
that a boundary represented by the shoreline, as stipulated in the 1890
Agreement, did not need any physical demarcation and the placement of
boundary pillars on the ground. Indeed, this theory is borne out by the
task of the Mixed Commission of 1898, to focus on the sections between
Lake Tanganyika and Lake Nyasa. As Brownlie puts it, the failure to de-
limit “may have little significance since a shoreline may not have been
considered susceptible to further delimitation.”172 In practical terms, sur-
vey maps utilizing natural features undoubtedly presented a better tool for
the busy—or perhaps lazy—administrator tasked with the responsibility of
resolving boundary disputes on the ground. In this vein, Donaldson has
noted that:
The rigorous marking of colonial boundaries would have required
regular maintenance from local colonial surveyors or administra-
tors who were not often available in these peripheral areas of the
Empire, particularly in the early decades of colonial administra-
tion. It was far easier and more cost-effective for British colonial
administration to simply ‘‘know’’ or ‘‘imagine’’ the extent of colo-
nial territory in Africa through boundary maps than to make
those boundaries evident on the ground for local borderland
populations.173
170. Ravi L. Kapil, On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa, 18
WORLD POL. 656, 660 (1966).
171. Commission of the African Union?Department of Peace and Security, Delimita-
tion and Demarcation of Boundaries in Africa: The User’s Guide, at 9 (2013), http://www
.peaceau.org/uploads/au2013-en-delim-a-demar-of-bound-gen-iss-a-studies-elec2.pdf.
172. Brownlie, supra note 29, at 259 (citing Hertslet, I., map facing p. 1, on progress of
delimitation, Jan. 1909).
173. See Donaldson, supra note 164, at 486.
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Donaldson concluded that rigorous demarcation was much less a priority
than surveying and mapping. In this reading, colonial boundaries on the
ground were thus seldom as precise as they appeared on the maps that
purported to delineate the extent of territorial sovereignty. But, as dis-
cussed above, the maps or cartographical instruments produced by the co-
lonial powers purporting to show the extent of their territorial
boundaries—as in the case of the Nyasaland-Tanganyika lake boundary—
were sometimes inconsistent, and thus of doubtful probative value. Yet,
these same boundaries and colonial maps were inherited and largely ac-
cepted as sacrosanct by Africa’s newly independent states.
D. The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890: Boundary Treaty
or Treaty of Sphere of Influence?
The foregoing discussion has proceeded on the assumption that the
1890 Agreement is a boundary agreement stricto sensu. An alternative
view, as noted above, would be that as a treaty marking out spheres of
influence rather than delimiting boundaries, it was not determinative of
the Nyasaland-Tanganyika boundary in 1890 and the subsequent period.
To be sure, as noted in Part I, this view has not been advocated by any
leading legal commentators who have expressed themselves on the issue.
The question, however, was addressed in another context by the dis-
senting Judge Weeramantry in the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Botswana v. Namibia). In my view, his approach has a particular rele-
vance to the Lake Malawi boundary dispute. Unlike the majority, Judge
Weeramantry raised the question whether the 1890 Agreement, which was
also at issue in this case, was an international boundary treaty or a sphere
of influence treaty?174 He concluded that it was the latter, citing in support
of this position the authoritative views of leading publicists, such as Op-
penheim, who wrote that sphere of influence treaties arose from “the un-
certainty of the extent of an occupation, and the tendency of colonizing
states to extend an occupation constantly and gradually into the interior or
‘hinterland’ of an occupied territory.”175 Judge Weeramantry followed
Brownlie in positing that, because a treaty of sphere of influence is impre-
cise and provisional, it gave a colonial power only a “moral claim” to the
territory in question, and that an exact boundary would crystallize into a
“true right” once the colonial power had established control and posses-
sion of the territory.176
This approach led Judge Weeramantry to conclude that the 1890
Agreement gave the Court “flexibility in the definition of the boundary
174. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep.
1045, ¶ 94 (Dec. 13) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
175. Id. (citing 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 691 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed., 1992)).
176. Id. ¶ 95 (citing Brownlie’s work in supra note 22, at 8–9). Brownlie does not, as
such, reject the status of the Anglo-German Treaty as a boundary treaty even if he inclines
towards Tanzania’s claim for a median line boundary.
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[without] departing from the terms of the Treaty.”177 In the case at hand, it
meant that, in Judge Weeramantry’s view, the Court could, for example,
“[make] provision for the integrity and preservation of important features
such as environmental preserves” and “[take] into account such factors as
that one interpretation will draw a line between a given people and the
land which they have traditionally used over a long period of time, while
the other will not.”178
Three points may be noted here. First, Judge Weeramantry was ap-
pealing to the Court to use its power to decide a case ex aequo et bono to
ensure that the delimitation of the boundary both recognized the rights of
the people who had occupied and used the disputed island from time to
time over a long period and protected the integrity of the island as one
comprehensive wildlife habitat and environmental preserve. Second,
Judge Weeramantry’s opinion was without prejudice to the principle of uti
possidetis, already recognized in African state practice and, as noted
above, given a judicial imprimatur by the ICJ in earlier decisions, includ-
ing the 1986 decision in the Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v
Mali).179 Judge Weeramantry was not oblivious to the fact that, although
the Court had acknowledged the applicability of equity as a principle in
boundary delimitation in the earlier case, it had also noted that equity
“[could] not be used to modify an established frontier in the sense of a
settled border.”180 He, however, did not accept that there was a settled
boundary in relation to the Kasikili/Sedudu Island.181 Third, it cannot be
overemphasized that the specific context of Judge Weeramantry’s opinion
was a disputed boundary over land territory that could be physically occu-
pied and used in the most obvious senses of these terms. The argument
cannot be applied with equal force and facility to a dispute involving sov-
ereignty over a mass of water that cannot be occupied in the physical sense
and in which the only land outcrops are three small uninhabited islands.
Thus the appeal to the Court’s equitable powers to avoid an outcome
insensitive to people living on a disputed island or communities who speak
the same language, share a similar culture, history, and environmental re-
sources, but have been split into two different states by arbitrary colonial-
177. Id. ¶ 98.
178. Id.
179. The ICJ has considered the principle of uti possidetis in series of cases over the
years involving border disputes from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle
East. See, e.g., Brian T. Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53
DUKE L.J. 1779 (2004); P. Mweti Munya, The International Court of Justice and Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes: Problems, Challenges and Prospects, 7 J. INT’L. L. & PRAC. 159 (1998)
(discussing how the ICJ has used uti possidetis to decide boundary disputes in Africa); Naldi,
supra note 136; Ratner, supra note 136. See also Andrew Rosen, Economic and Cooperative
Post-Colonial Borders: How Two Interpretations of Borders by the I.C.J. May Undermine the
Relationship Between Uti Possidetis Juris and Democracy, 25 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 207
(2007).
180. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep.
1045, ¶ 105 (Dec. 13) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
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era treaties does not readily hold in respect of the Malawi-Tanzania lake
boundary. This is not to suggest that these considerations are wholly with-
out significance. They may be taken into account, as I argue in Part III(A)
below, when it comes to protecting the customary rights of the communi-
ties on Tanzania’s side of the border who have traditionally depended on
the resources of the lake for their livelihoods due to their proximity to the
border. In fact, in contrast to Judge Weeramantry’s dissent, the decision in
the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island noted that “[w]hile the treaty
in question is not a boundary treaty proper but a treaty delimiting spheres
of influence, the Parties nonetheless accept it as the treaty determining the
boundary between their territories.”182 Similarly, Tanzania has never
claimed that the 1890 Anglo-German Treaty is not a treaty determining its
boundaries with Malawi and its other neighbors. Rather, its contention
was that the treaty wrongly or unfairly placed the boundary on the shore-
line when it should have been located along the median line of the lake,
which in Tanzania’s view would be more equitable and in accordance with
the normal practice in international law.183 But, even this position only
emerged after years of repeated official acknowledgement and acceptance
of the location of the boundary as described in Article I(2).
III. COMPETITION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES AS A ROOT CAUSE
OF BORDER DISPUTES
The resurgent dispute between Malawi and Tanzania is only one of
several recent border disputes in the Eastern African region. The region
has recently witnessed heightened tensions and increasing potential for in-
terstate conflicts due to growing discoveries, or rumors of the existence, of
natural resources on borders or in borderlands.184 The price boom wit-
nessed during the past decade for these commodities is particularly attrib-
uted to the rapid economic development and transformation in China and
its insatiable demand for these resources. The competing efforts to access
African minerals and other extractive resources have been described as
leading to a new scramble for Africa. This race has, in turn, led to an
increase in the value of territories that had hitherto been neglected or
marginalized, resulting in the increased phenomenon among governments
in Africa to partition the land into concessionary blocks awarded to
mainly Chinese and Western companies to prospect for natural resources,
182. Id. ¶ 43.
183. This view was first clearly expressed by President Nyerere on May 31, 1967 when
he addressed high school pupils at Iringa, a town in the central highlands of Tanzania, and
declared that Tanzania could no longer accept the shoreline as the boundary, but instead
recognized the median line, which was more equitable and fair. See Mayall, supra note 3, at
617.
184. See, e.g., Okumu, supra note 165, at 279; Khadiagala, supra note 98, at 272-73, 275-
76.
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such as oil, gas, and precious minerals. I argue that the prospecting for gas
and oil in Lake Malawi is part of this trend.185
An early commentator located the source of the earlier phase of the
Malawi-Tanzania boundary dispute in 1967–68 not in territorial claims, but
in the deteriorating bilateral relations arising from Malawi’s close relations
with the white minority regimes in southern Africa at the time. Mayall
suggested that, given Kamuzu Banda’s close relationship with the Portu-
guese colonial regime in Mozambique, Tanzania feared that the northern
part of the lake might be used as an infiltration route for the Portuguese to
pursue FRELIMO freedom fighters who were based in sanctuaries across
the Rovuma River, which forms the Tanzania-Mozambique international
boundary.186 While this may be true, there can be no doubt that today,
competition for resources is clearly the major reason and trigger for the
resurgence of the dispute. It is estimated that just over two million peo-
ple—about 1.5 million Malawians and 600,000 Tanzanians—depend on
Lake Malawi for their livelihoods. Subsistence fishing and agriculture con-
stitute the major activities for the affected communities in the coastal re-
gions bordering the lake.187
Mining, commercial agriculture, tourism, and energy production
would enhance the economic exploitation of the natural resources offered
by or associated with the lake. Surestream Petroleum, which, as men-
tioned earlier, was awarded oil and gas exploration licenses by the Malawi
Government in 2011, is only one of four companies that have since been
granted exclusive prospecting blocks on the lake.188 The Malawi-Tanzania
boundary dispute confirms the common observation that the economic po-
tential of border territories previously considered marginal tends to raise
185. There has lately emerged a fair amount of literature on China’s quest for natural
resources and its rising presence in Africa. For brief but instructive studies, see Chris Alden
& Anna C. Alves, China and Africa’s Natural Resources: The Challenges and Implications for
Development and Governance, Occasional Paper No. 41, S. AFR. INST. OF INT’L AFF. (Sept.
2009); Kent Butts & Brent Bankus, China’s Pursuit of Africa’s Natural Resources, Cent. for
Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, June 2009. See also Okumu, supra note 165, at
279.
186. Mayall, supra note 3, at 616 (suggesting that as President Nyerere became resigned
to President Banda’s position on southern Africa’s liberation struggle and his continuing
friendship with the racist minority regimes in Mozambique and South Africa, the question of
Lake Malawi disappeared from Tanzania’s national agenda).
187. Mabvuto Banda, Two Million People Hold their Breath over Lake Malawi Media-
tion, INTER-PRESS NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/two-mil-
lion-people-hold-their-breath-over-lake-malawi-mediation/.
188. The Malawi Government has awarded exclusive prospecting licenses, under the
Petroleum and Exploration Act of 1983, for six blocks on the lake to four companies as
follows: Block 1: SacOil (12,265 square kilometers, north-western block bordering Tanzania
and Zambia, awarded in 2012); Block 2 and 3: Surestream Petroleum (20,200 square kilome-
ters, north and central blocks, awarded in 2011); Block 4 and 5: RakGas LL.C. (awarded in
2013); and Block 6: Pacific Oil and Gas (awarded in 2013). See Press Release, supra note 5;
see also Rachael Etter-Phoya, Two Additional Companies Awarded with [sic] Exploration
Rights by Malawi amid Unresolved Lake Dispute, MINING IN MALAWI (Nov. 20, 2013), http://
www.mininginmalawi.com/2013/11/15/two-additional-companies-awarded-with-exploration-
rights-amid-unresolved-lake-dispute/.
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the stakes even among the best of neighbors, which of course Malawi and
Tanzania have never been. An unnamed Tanzanian member of parliament,
who participated in the earlier rounds of negotiations between the two
countries, is reported to have remarked that if there were only fish in the
lake, the border might not be such a tense issue between them.189
Contested sovereignty over resource-rich borderlands is not uncom-
mon in Africa. The dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the
Bakassi Peninsula, settled by the ICJ in 2002, is perhaps the best known
among recent boundary disputes in Africa.190 These developments have in
some cases compounded pre-existing bad situations. Two historical factors
lie behind these situations. First, most colonial-era boundaries inherited at
independence were, and remain, improperly delimited and poorly demar-
cated. Reference has already been made to the fact that the Mixed Com-
mission established in 1898 did not demarcate the boundary in the now
disputed section of the Nyasaland-Tanganyika border in terms of Article
VI of the Agreement of 1890. Second, most post-colonial African govern-
ments either procrastinated in correcting the historical legacies and errors
in colonial boundary-making, or simply did not appreciate the urgent need
to do so. The Tanganyikan authorities, both during the period of internal
self-government from May 1959 until independence in December 1961
and in the period following independence, not only failed to challenge the
status quo, but publicly and officially confirmed acceptance of the bound-
ary as defined in 1890. Moreover, although Prime Minister Kawawa had
indicated that, in the event that it wished to negotiate the issues raised by
Chief Mhaiki in 1962, Tanganyika would only negotiate with the govern-
ment of an independent Nyasaland, the government of the newly estab-
lished United Republic of Tanzania procrastinated for three full years
after Malawi’s independence on July 6, 1964 before raising its objection in
May 1967. It may be pointed out in passing that President Nyerere was
supposed to go on a state visit to Malawi shortly after Malawi’s indepen-
dence in 1964, but the visit was cancelled presumably because of his objec-
tion to a recent visit to Malawi by Ian Smith, the prime minister of
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). This was just before the Malawi
cabinet crisis referred to at the outset of this discussion.191 One can only
speculate as to whether it might have been part of Nyerere’s idea to nego-
tiate about the lake with Banda as “independent equals” during this visit.
189. Yoon, supra note 31, at 83.
190. See generally Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria Case
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303 (Oct. 10). The Botswana–Namibia dispute over
Kasikili/Sedudu Island was also, at bottom, about the economic interests of the parties; the
disputed island was regarded not only as a potential resource for wildlife-based tourism, but
also as an agrarian interest for the pastoral Masubian community. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island
Case (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045 (Dec. 13) (Weeramantry, J.,
dissenting).
191. Mayall, supra note 3, at 1 n.1; COLIN BAKER, REVOLT OF THE MINISTERS: THE
MALAWI CABINET CRISIS 1964–1965 115 (2001).
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Although, in my view, Malawi has the better legal claim, at a bilateral
level both Malawi and Tanzania would do well to consider less absolutist
solutions to the dispute. With an estimated two million people from some
of the most vulnerable countries in the world depending on the lake, as
indicated earlier, a resource management solution that takes into account
the sustainability of the livelihoods of these communities will ultimately be
beneficial to both countries and the region as a whole. This suggests that a
solution that puts in place a joint mechanism for the shared management
and use of transboundary and borderlands resources would better serve
the interests of the two neighbors than an interminable and uncertain fight
over the absolutist delimitation of the lake boundary. The outcomes of the
Cameroon-Nigeria dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula and the Botswana-
Namibia dispute over Kasikili/Sedudu Island are evidence that even when
a judicial settlement awards disputed territory to one party against the
other, a political mechanism may still need to be put in place for the
shared management of border resources that gave rise to the dispute in the
first place.192 These cases also demonstrate that respect for the principle of
uti possidetis and the protection of the sanctity of borders need not mean
the maintenance of a status quo that refuses to acknowledge the shared
needs of affected local populations within the border areas.
A. Protection of Customary Rights in Boundary Zones
and Borderlands
Another issue that calls for a brief comment here concerns the ques-
tion of customary rights enjoyed by foreign nationals in boundary zones or
borderlands. It is acknowledged that historically the nationals of Tanzania
have always exercised certain territorial rights in the disputed part of the
lake with respect to the use of the lake’s waters for their subsistence needs.
192. Despite the fact that Botswana was awarded judgment in its dispute against
Namibia, the two states agreed through subsequent bilateral diplomatic negotiations to allow
Namibians to have access to the river (for fishing). A more pertinent post-ICJ diplomatic
mechanism was that established through the UN Secretary-General’s good offices in the
Cameroon v. Nigeria case. Following Nigeria’s rejection of the ICJ judgment, Secretary-Gen-
eral Kofi Annan intensified his mediation efforts, which he had started in September 2002 in
anticipation of a rejection of an unfavorable decision by either party, to get both states to
agree to implement the judgment. At a meeting in Geneva on November 15, 2005, barely five
days after the Court’s decision had been made public, the leaders of the two countries agreed
to establish a mixed commission consisting of Cameroonian and Nigerian representatives,
chaired by the U.N. For a number of years following its inception in November 2002, the
mixed commission met multiple times, alternating between the capitals of the two countries,
Abuja and Yaounde, overseeing, inter alia, the withdrawal of Nigeria’s administrative, mili-
tary, and police personnel in the disputed Lake Chad and Bakassi Peninsula areas and the
eventual transfer of authority to the Cameroon. As Secretary General Kofi Annan remarked
subsequently, Cameroon and Nigeria had demonstrated that given timely and appropriate
U.N. support, African states can wind down conflicts and resolve their differences peacefully.
The present writer participated in the initial meetings of the mixed commission in 2003 in
Abuja and Yaounde as part of the UN team. See United Nations Office for West Africa
[UNOWA], Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, http://unowa.unmissions.org/Default.aspx
?tabid=747.
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Putting aside the issue of ownership of the three uninhabited islands, the
question that might plausibly be posed is whether the enjoyment and exer-
cise by Tanzanians of such rights in Malawian territory—the water area
and the three small uninhabited islands—could establish a prescriptive ti-
tle that can legitimately be relied upon by Tanzania in its claim for sover-
eign ownership of the lake. The issue of the existence or survival of local
customary rights enjoyed by foreign nationals within a disputed boundary
zone has been addressed by international judicial tribunals before: in the
Case Concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory,193 the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case,194 and the Rann of Kutch Arbitration,195 re-
ferred to above. The issues in these cases were admittedly different from
those calling for consideration here, but Judge Bebler’s dissenting opinion
in the last-mentioned case is relevant and instructive. Judge Bebler ob-
served, in relation to the grazing of cattle by Pakistan nationals in the dis-
puted territory, that, “being a purely private activity, [it] would not
constitute display of State authority. It might constitute the basis of a
claim for an international servitude in the neighbor’s territory, but, Paki-
stan did not formulate such a claim.”196
The existence of local customary rights, for example, those relating to
fishing, navigation, and the use of the water for agriculture, is significant
because of the probative value attached to such rights in determining the
location of a boundary. However, the classical view is that customary
rights granted to and enjoyed by private individuals cannot as such pro-
vide a basis for a claim of sovereign title by the national state of the indi-
viduals over the foreign territory in which they enjoy those rights
exercised. This view, captured in Judge Bebler’s dictum above, has quite
correctly been criticized by some commentators in more recent times. In
his critique of the ICJ judgment in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case, Gathii
has noted, regarding the Court’s treatment of the implications for title to
the disputed island of the Masubian community of Namibia, how the law
of title to territory in Africa today still embeds within it a colonial and
imperial imprint. He goes on to argue that:
This colonial and imperial imprint is mostly evidenced by the
treatment of territory as mere geographical and economic spheres
in respect of which colonial states entered into transactions, such
as treaties, with each other. Consequently, in relation to claims
arising during European colonization, it is these geographical, ec-
onomic and transactional relations between European powers
that foreground the determination of boundary and territorial dis-
putes at the expense of African presence on the territory. African
presence on the territory as an independent evidentiary basis for
193. Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment,
1960 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (Apr. 12).
194. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116 (Dec. 18).
195. Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India v. Pak.), 7 I.L.M. 633 (1968).
196. Id. at 702.
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the determination of territorial title or boundary delimitation is
de-emphasized as merely “acts of private persons” occupation and
use and/or occupation without a belief that such use and occupa-
tion arises from original title to territory.197
The argument that the colonial acquisition of territory in Africa de-
nied African agency and that it gave no recognition to the rights of the
African peoples in occupation or use of the territories in question legal
title is not new, and has been referred to above.198 But, of course, this
argument becomes relevant where the issue of grounding title in the cus-
tomary use and occupation of the land arises. As already noted, this does
not appear to be the basis of Tanzania’s claim, since it also accepts that,
generally speaking, the three islands have always been uninhabited. Be-
sides, as far as the present writer is aware, like Pakistan in the Rann of
Kutch Arbitration,199 Tanzania has not formulated its argument in terms of
an international servitude. This dispute presents a situation whereby the
delimitation of the boundary is in any case expressly governed by treaty
provisions and is not left to be determined simply on the basis of consider-
ations of acquiescence, estoppel, good faith, and customary usage. The
analogy with the Masubian situation in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case is,
therefore, of passing relevance only.
The question of whether or not Malawi should continue to guarantee
Tanzanian nationals access to the territory and resources of the disputed
islands is one for political and diplomatic, rather than legal, determination.
This would be an aspect of the suggested solution rooted in the combined
concepts of shared management and utilization of borderlands resources
and shared international watercourses. Here, again, it may be instructive
to turn to some of the dicta in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case. It may be
recalled that in his dissenting opinion, Judge Weeramantry invoked the
Court’s powers to decide a matter ex aequo et bono both to avoid an out-
come insensitive to people living on the disputed island and to apply prin-
ciples of international environmental law to ensure that any boundary
delimitation does not undermine the integrity of the disputed island “[as]
one comprehensive whole.”200 While acknowledging that the Court was
not a boundary-maker, he encouraged it to nevertheless take into account
certain environmental concerns under “modern international law,” inter-
preting and applying and the 1890 Agreement.201 I return to a discussion
of the shared management of borderlands resources in the context of
SADC regional integration and development policy below.
This “modern international law” was more specifically identified in
another dissenting opinion in the same case by Judge Kooijmans, who
197. See Gathii, supra note 153, at 606.
198. See Anghie, supra note 19.
199. Rann of Kutch Arbitration, 7 I.L.M. 633, 689–90 (1968).
200. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep.
1045, ¶¶ 100–01 (Dec. 13) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
201. Id. ¶ 103.
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made reference to Article 5 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses of 1997, which en-
shrines the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of interna-
tional watercourses.202 Here, Judge Kooijmans held that the fact that the
Convention was not yet in force “does not mean that [principles] which
are formulated in the convention have not become part of the corpus of
international law,”203 and argued that the principle of equitable and rea-
sonable utilization codified an existing customary international norm.204
Since neither Malawi nor Tanzania is a party to the Convention, it may be
tempting to conclude that it is not applicable to their dispute. But, to the
extent that it codifies customary international law in some aspects, this fact
is irrelevant. If the matter came before it, the application by the ICJ of
principles of equity, as permitted under Article 38(2) of its Statute, or
principles of international environmental law to the dispute would be con-
sistent with the view that territorial sovereignty is no longer an absolute
doctrine that allows for no exceptions.205
202. GA Res. 51/229, art. 5 (July 8, 1997). Article 5 introduces the new concept of equi-
table participation and sets forth what is regarded as the cornerstone of the law of interna-
tional watercourses, namely the principle that a state must use an international watercourse
in a manner that is reasonable and equitable vis-a`-vis other states sharing the watercourse.
According to Article 5, equitable and reasonable use means that the use must also be consis-
tent with adequate protection of the watercourse from pollution and other forms of degrada-
tion. This concept was essentially confirmed by the ICJ barely four months after the adoption
of the U.N. Convention in the Case Concerning the Gabicikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 92, ¶ 85 (Sept. 25). The term “watercourse” is defined
in Article 2 of the Convention as a “system of surface waters and groundwater constituting
by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common
terminus.” See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES:
NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES (2001) for a general discussion of the evolution of the modern law
of international watercourses. Professor McCaffrey served as a special rapporteur for the
International Law Commission’s draft articles on the law of the non-navigational uses of
international watercourses, which formed the basis for the U.N. Convention. The Convention
influenced the adoption of the 2000 Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses of the South-
ern African Development Community.
203. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep.
1045, ¶ 31 (Dec. 13) (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.).
204. Id. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of Interna-
tional Watercourses on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
which entered into force on August 17, 2014, establishes basic standards and rules for cooper-
ation between watercourse states on the use, management, and protection of international
watercourses. A relevant regional treaty to which Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania are
signatories is the Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Devel-
opment Community adopted in Windhoek, Namibia, on Aug. 7, 2000. However, it is not yet
in force. Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development
Community Aug. 7, 2000, http://www.sadc.int/files/3413/6698/6218/Revised_Protocol_on_
Shared_Watercourses_-_2000_-_English.pdf.
205. Arguably, the ICJ’s decision in the Case Concerning the Gabicikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hung. v. Slovak.) referred to in the preceding note already provides an indication of
how it would likely approach the question. For a long period, four major theories dominated
international water law:  absolute territorial sovereignty (also known as the Harmon Doc-
trine, which gave complete freedom of action to an upper riparian state); absolute territorial
integrity (no action by upper riparian states that might affect downstream riparian states);
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The relevance of international environmental law to this dispute is
self-evident. Since the award of the first concession to Surestream Petro-
leum, environmental concerns have been voiced by local communities in
the coastal areas in Malawi and by the international community. Partly in
response to these concerns, which are real and legitimate, the Malawi gov-
ernment’s Environmental Affairs Department and some local civil society
and environmental non-governmental organizations have been conducting
public hearings on the environmental and social impact assessment
presented by Surestream Petroleum on the seismic operations for the ex-
ploration of oil in the lake.206 At the international level, the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World
Heritage Centre and the International Union for the Conservation of Na-
ture (IUCN) have also become involved, given the lake’s status as a
UNESCO World Heritage site with the establishment of the Lake Malawi
National Park in 1984.207 In their joint assessment of the situation in early
2013, the two organizations noted that, whilst the area where oil explora-
tion activities have been approved lies outside the World Heritage prop-
erty, the risks associated with oil drilling anywhere in the lake could affect
the entire lake ecosystem and represent a significant threat to the unique
assemblage of endemic fish species, other biodiversity, and associated evo-
lutionary processes, which are the basis for the property’s inscription on
the World Heritage List. On the basis of these considerations, the World
Heritage Committee adopted the following decision on May 17, 2013:
The World Heritage Committee expresses its concerns about oil
exploration activities in Lake Malawi, and considers that oil drill-
ing poses a potentially severe risk to the integrity of the entire
limited territorial sovereignty (obligation on each riparian state not to use territory in such a
way as to cause harm to other states); and community of interest (shared use by the commu-
nity of states sharing the watercourse). In his analyses of these theories, McCaffrey comes to
the conclusion that the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty appears to come closest to
describing the actual situation produced by state practice, while also noting that the commu-
nity of interest theory appears in international legal instruments establishing joint institutions
for managing shared watercourses. See Case Concerning the Gabicikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung. v Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 92, 171 (Sept. 25). For some earlier discussions
of these theories, see Dante A. Caponera, Patterns of Cooperation in International Water
Law: Principles and Institutions, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563 (1985); David J. Lazerwitz, The
Flow of International Water Law: The International Law Commission’s Law of the Non-Navi-
gational Uses of International Watercourses, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 247 (1993); Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments for Managing Internationally–Shared Water Resources:
Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of Property, 18 COLUM. J. INT’L L. 27 (1993). See also
Stephen McCaffrey, The Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Naviga-
tional Uses of International Watercourses, 1 INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 250 (2001).
206. See, e.g., Rachel Etter-Phoya, Public Hearings for Surestream Petroleum Seismic
Operations for Oil Exploration in Lake Malawi, MINING IN MALAWI (Jan. 17, 2014), http://
mininginmalawi.com/2014/01/17/public-hearing-for-surestreampetroleum-seismic-operations-
for-oil-exploration-in-lake-malawi/.
207. The Lake Malawi National Park was inscribed to the World Heritage List in 1984
by the UNESCO World Heritage Committee. World Heritage Committee, 8th Sess., Report
of the Rapporteur, SC/84/CONF.004/9 (Nov. 2, 1984).
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lake ecosystem, including the aquatic zone and shoreline of the
property and reiterates that mining, oil and gas exploration and
exploitation are incompatible with World Heritage status. The
Committee further requests the State Party of Malawi to submit
to the World Heritage Centre, by 1 February 2014, a report on the
state of conservation of the property, including the requested in-
formation on the oil exploration activities, for examination by the
World Heritage Committee at its 38th session in 2014.208
The World Heritage Committee followed up the adoption of this deci-
sion by sending a fact-finding mission, the first of its kind since Lake
Malawi’s inscription to the World Heritage List in 1984, from March 30 to
April 4, 2014 to assess the likely environmental impact of oil drilling in the
lake on the eco-habitat and local populations. One important recommen-
dation emanating from this mission is for Malawi to consult with
Mozambique and Tanzania on the environmental implications of any drill-
ing activities in the lake and to expand the protected area (property) to
the lake shores and islands.209 This recommendation is most appropriate.
Irrespective of the outcome of the disputed ownership of the northern
reaches of the lake, from the environmental perspective, the lake must be
treated, to borrow the words of Judge Weearamantry in the Kasikili/
Sedudu Island Case, “as one comprehensive whole.” As a shared environ-
mental space, the management of potential adverse environmental effects
of any drilling activities in the lake will necessarily require a cooperative,
multilateral approach. This is all the more so because, as the UNESCO/
IUCN report noted, Malawi is not a party to the International Convention
on Oil Pollution Preparedness Response and Cooperation of 1990, which
requires parties to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents
either nationally or in cooperation with other countries.210 Both Malawi
and Tanzania are signatories to the Revised Protocol on Shared Water-
courses in the Southern African Development Community of 2000 (Re-
vised SADC Protocol), which obligates state parties individually or, where
appropriate, jointly to protect and preserve the ecosystem of a shared wa-
tercourse (under Article 4(2)(a)), but it is not yet in force. In the absence
of treaty obligations, principles of customary international law relating to
transboundary pollution are the only applicable law.
Trans-border or cross-border cooperation is necessary for the manage-
ment of transboundary environmental hazards. Economic and border co-
208. World Heritage Committee, 37th Sess., at 23 WHC-13/37.com/7B.Add. (May 17,
2013), http:/whc.unesco.org/archive/2013/whc13-37com-7B-Add-en.pdf. See also World Heri-
tage Committee, 37th Sess., Decision, WHC-13/37.com/7B.5 (May 3, 2013), http://whc.unesco
.org/archive/2013/whc13-37com-7B-en.pdf (showing Malawi did not meet the stated submis-
sion deadline).
209. IUCN & UNESCO, Mission Report: Reactive Mission to Lake Malawi National
Park (Malawi), WHC.14/38.com/ (May 2014).
210. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Coopera-
tion art. 1 ¶ 1, Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 78, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/
Volume%201891/volume-1891-I-32194-English.pdf.
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operation is also mutually beneficial to advance economic activities.
Rosen has discussed the concept of economic and cooperative post-colo-
nial borders through an examination of the Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case
and other ICJ decisions involving boundary disputes in which it was asked
to apply, explicitly or implicitly, the principle of uti possidetis. Like Gathii,
he also focuses on Judge Weeramantry’s proposal that instead of delinea-
tion, “certain disputed border regions may be cooperatively governed
based on each country’s obligations to an external treaty regime or inter-
national obligations,” (for example, international environmental treaties
or the U.N. Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Wa-
tercourses, as mentioned above).211 While characterizing it as an interest-
ing proposal, Rosen admits that it may not be feasible, which Judges
Weeramantry and Kooijmans both implicitly recognized in their dissenting
opinions. But his conclusion is categorical, stating that:
Perhaps most apparent . . . is that post-colonial borders are in-
creasingly under attack, both legally and diplomatically, over pre-
sent or future economic interests . . . . These new disputes are not
over polities. Nor are they over conflicting identities of the poli-
ties within post-colonial borders. Rather, they are over
resources.212
The concept of borderlands has been the focus of recent boundary
studies. Borderlands are described as those regions whose economic and
social life is directly and significantly affected by proximity to an interna-
tional boundary. Scholarly discourses in this area have articulated the con-
cept of borderlands as denoting those administrative regions of a country
that coincide with the country’s international boundaries and the idea of
borderlands of prosperity.213 The concept of borderlands has been in-
211. Rosen, supra note 179. Rosen also discusses Maritime Delimitation and Territorial
Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 40 (Mar.
16); Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria),
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303.
212. Rosen, supra note 179, at 249.
213. The following discussions generally provide comparative perspectives on the con-
cept of borderlands as applied to other African situations in which the issue of shared ex-
ploitation and management of border resources is relevant. These situations offer relevant
examples for the multilateral arrangement for the shared management of the Lake Malawi
basin/borderlands between Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania proposed in this essay. See
A.I. Asiwaju, Borderlands in Africa: A Comparative Research Perspective with Particular Ref-
erence to Western Europe, in AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: BARRIERS, CONDUITS, AND OPPORTU-
NITIES 253–65 (Paul Nugent & A.I. Asiwaju eds., 1996); see also NILES HANSEN, THE
BORDER ECONOMY: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHWEST passim (1981); DEVELOP-
MENT OF BORDER REGIONS: NIGERIA AND PROXIMATE NEIGHBORS IN WEST AND CENTRAL
AFRICA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP HELD AT AFRICAN UNIVERSITY INSTI-
TUTE, IMEKO, NIGERIA, DEC. 5-7, 2006 (A.I. Asiwaju ed.); Wafula Okumu, The Purpose and
Functions of International Boundaries: With Specific Reference to Africa, in DELIMITATION
AND DEMARCATION OF BOUNDARIES IN AFRICA: GENERAL ISSUES AND CASE STUDIES 37
(2013); A.I. Asiwaju, The Factor of Affected Local Populations, in DELIMITATION AND DE-
MARCATION OF BOUNDARIES IN AFRICA: GENERAL ISSUES AND CASE STUDIES 136 (2013).
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voked as particularly appropriate for addressing resource-driven boundary
conflicts. It has been observed, for example, that “[b]orderlands where
mineral resources are being explored or exploited are experiencing in-
creasingly frequent disputes over land claims, delimitation disputes . . . and
bitter political exchanges between governments.”214 In his study of bound-
aries in eastern Africa, Khadiagala has distinguished between two con-
trasting spatial trajectories: frontiers of insecurity and borderlands of
economic prosperity.215 He has identified the “sharing of maritime re-
sources in Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, and Malawi” as belonging to the
latter category.216 However, there is a significant difference between
Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika, on the one hand, and Lake Malawi on the
other. Tanzania’s international boundaries with her riparian neighbors on
these lakes follow the median lines. These boundaries have never been
contested and, on paper at least, it should be easier for the concerned
states to agree upon arrangements for shared development and exploita-
tion of the boundary maritime resources. Lake Malawi presents a different
challenge.
As noted at the outset of this discussion, the current dispute was trig-
gered by Malawi’s decision to award contracts for exploration of oil and
gas in the lake.217 Tanzania’s apparent desire to control or participate in
the exploitation of these maritime resources—at least in the part of the
lake that it lays claim to—is understandable. Beyond the perceived poten-
tial of oil and gas production, there also remain the other economic activi-
ties that the local populations on the eastern shore of the lake have
customarily enjoyed:   subsistence fishing, agriculture, tourism, and other
uses of the waters of the lake. All these activities could be further devel-
oped to a commercial scale for the benefit of the riparian communities on
both the Malawian and Tanzanian sides. In this sense the Malawi-Tanzania
border dispute has echoes of the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria
over the Bakassi Peninsula, which at heart was a dispute over control of
the area’s rich mineral, oil, gas, and fisheries resources. Over the decades,
Africa has witnessed resource-driven border disputes, some of which have
resulted in limited armed conflicts. A notable example was the dispute
between Chad and Libya over the Aouzou Strip, a strip of land in north-
ern Chad along the border with Libya rich in mineral resources.218 It is
salutary that Malawi and Tanzania remain committed to resolving their
dispute peacefully.
214. Okumu, supra note 165, at 281.
215. Khadiagala, supra note 98, at 267.
216. Id. at 276.
217. See Kok, supra note 2.
218. The dispute led to a brief outbreak of armed hostilities from August to September
1987 when the OAU intervened to broker a tentative ceasefire. For a brief discussion of the
dispute, see Gino J. Naldi, The Aouzou Strip Dispute—A Legal Analysis, 33 J. AFR. L. 72
(1989). The dispute was finally settled in favor of Chad by the ICJ in 1994. Territorial Dispute
Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, (1994) I.C.J. Rep. 6.
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B. SADC’s Spatial Development Initiatives and Shared Management
of Borderland Resources
The issues discussed in the foregoing section lead to the following
question: beyond supporting the meditation effort, what role can SADC
proactively play to facilitate the integration of the disputed lake boundary
region into its spatial development initiatives, whatever the outcome of
the dispute? The economic vision of SADC is to transform its fifteen
member states from operating as individual fragmented markets into a sin-
gle integrated economic space and a globally competitive market charac-
terized by free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor.
Underlying this vision is the principle of forging closer economic coopera-
tion as a means of promoting economic development within the context of
the global economy. Among the strategies devised for achieving this vision
are the spatial development initiatives (SDIs) and development corri-
dors.219 One of the first to be established was the Mtwara Development
Corridor, involving Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.220
The primary objectives of the Mtwara Development Corridor have
been described as: first, to develop a transportation corridor to link the
southern regions of Tanzania with Malawi and Zambia across Lake
Malawi and Mozambique; second, to provide strategic access for Malawi
to the Tanzanian port of Mtwara; and third, to mobilize investment in sup-
port of the utilization of the Mtwara Development Corridor’s tremen-
dously rich natural resource base.221 The corridor’s planning area includes
parts of the central region of Malawi, the northern areas of Mozambique,
the southern and southwestern regions of Tanzania, and the eastern and
northeastern provinces of Zambia. Aside from the focus on the develop-
ment of transportation links, the Mtwara Development Corridor has also
led to the development of other initiatives. Of immediate relevance to this
discussion is the Mtwara Development Corridor Conservation Initia-
tive,222 which aims to develop a resource management framework that
both addresses the problems that development will bring and maximizes
its opportunities. The inherent development potential of the area is very
219. G.R.M. de Beer, R.A. Mmatli, A.C. Mahumane, S.C. Nyathi, & F.H. Soares, Spa-
tial Development Initiatives and the Future Development of the Southern African Border-
lands (1998) (unpublished manuscript prepared for Maputo Corridor Company Policy
Research Programme, Nelspruit, South Africa) (on file with author).
220. First conceived in 1998, the Mtwara Development Corridor Agreement was signed
by the heads of state of Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia in Lilongwe, Malawi,
on December 14, 2004. See Mtwara Development Corridor Conservation Initiative, WWF
GLOBAL http://wwf.panda.org/who_we_are/wwf_offices/tanzania/wwf_tanzania_our_solu
tions/index.cfm?uProjectID=9F0793.
221. See G.R.M. de Beer, Regional Development Corridors and Spatial Development
Initiatives—Some Current Perspectives on Potentials and Progress (2001) (paper presented
at the Conference on Meeting the Transport Challenges in Southern Africa, South Africa,
July 16-20, 2001, at 8–11).
222. For a brief description on the initiative, see Mtwara Development Corridor Conser-
vation Initiative, WWF GLOBAL http://wwf.panda.org/who_we_are/wwf_offices/tanzania/wwf
_tanzania_our_solutions/index.cfm?uProjectID=9F0793.
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high. All four countries have very good agricultural, mining, and tourism
development potential, which provide a potentially sound basis for a wide
range of economic activities. There are a number of particularly impres-
sive economic projects that have been identified. They include mining,
power generation, development of gas reserves, coastal and inland fisher-
ies development, agriculture, wildlife, and tourism.223
The commitment of the SADC member states to regional integration
and collaboration as a means of promoting greater levels of economic
growth and development is not in doubt. It is equally clear that these
countries also acknowledge the opportunity for broader based economic
development that could accompany the rehabilitation of the transporta-
tion infrastructure. In my view, an approach to the shared management
and exploitation of borderlands resources that is consistent with the bor-
derlands concept described above would fall squarely within SADC’s SDIs
and development corridor objectives and strategies. Although it still re-
mains a work in progress, there can be no doubt that the potential socio-
economic impact of the Mtwara Development Corridor on the local
populations, in particular, is very substantial.
As has been noted by Bootsma, until fairly recently there was virtually
no coordination among the riparian countries, Malawi, Mozambique, and
Tanzania, regarding research and management in the lake and its catch-
ment area.224 Recognizing this need, in 2003 the three countries, with sup-
port from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), developed a
draft convention on the sustainable development of the lake and its ba-
sin.225 The draft proposed the establishment of a Lake Malawi/Niassa/
Nyasa Basin Commission, modelled along the lines of similar riparian or-
ganizations elsewhere, such as the Lake Victoria Basin Commission, estab-
lished under the auspices of the East African Community through the
Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin, adopted on
November 29, 2003. The draft convention envisaged a strong mandate for
the commission that would include disseminating data and research re-
lated to the lake and water resources, monitoring environmental condi-
tions in the lake basin, and enhancing cooperation among various
governmental and non-governmental agencies, as well as private sector en-
tities, involved in activities related to natural resources management in the
lake. Unlike the Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria
223. Id. For a report on “anchor projects” of the MDC in Malawi, see generally NEIL
GARDEN, MTWARA DEVELOPMENT CORRIDOR: A REGIONAL SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT INITI-
ATIVE (2006).
224. See H. A. Bootsma & Sven Erik Jorgensen, Lake Malawi/Nyasa: Experience and
Lessons Learned Brief, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE FOUNDATION, LAKE
BASIN MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS LEARNED BRIEFS 259–76
(2005), http://iwlearn.net/iw-projects/1665/experience-notes-and-lessons-learned/lake_malawi
_nyasa_2005.pdf.
225. See Report of Lake Malawi/Niassa/Nyasa Donors and Partners Meeting, May
12–13, 203, Mangochi, Malawi, Annex F: The Convention on the Sustainable Development
of Lake Malawi/Niassa/Nysaa and its Basin, http://www.ramsar.rgis.ch/pdf/mtg/mtg_malawi_
wwf_2003_annex1.pdf.
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Basin and the Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tan-
ganyika, also adopted in 2003, the Lake Malawi/Niassa/Nyasa draft con-
vention has never seen the light of day and appears to have been
definitively abandoned, for reasons that are not altogether obvious.226 A
possible explanation might be the competing demands placed upon the
three riparian states to subsume this project within the broader SADC
shared watercourses initiative and the Revised Protocol on Shared Water-
courses in the Southern African Development Community of 2000, which,
as was noted earlier, is not yet in force.227 In any event, I argue that a
coordinated approach by Malawi and Tanzania to the joint development
and utilization of the borderland resources within the area, including Lake
Malawi, would advance both the national interests of the two parties and
SADC’s agenda of regional integration and economic development. It
would also strengthen the environmental management of a geographical
region that must, as suggested earlier, be treated as one comprehensive
whole with a unified spatial regional strategy.
In practical terms, how can the resources in the disputed territory be
equitably managed and utilized by the two parties and other riparian
states? Two points should be noted. First, the shared management and util-
ization of the resources of an international watercourse does not mean co-
ownership of the resources, still less joint sovereignty over the territory in
which they are located. The 1997 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and other international
treaties regulating the shared management and utilization of international
watercourses, such as the Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the
Southern African Development Community of 2000, are premised on this
understanding. Second, while I argue that a collaborative, multilateral ap-
proach would produce the most efficient outcome to the dispute, this is
not the place to lay out in great detail a concrete proposal for the institu-
tional mechanism or arrangements needed to achieve this objective. The
nature and structure of such a mechanism will vary in its detail from one
watercourse system to another. Each arrangement has to be designed with
regard to its own specificity, the nature of resources in play, and the
shared policy objectives of the riparian or basin states involved, among
other considerations. Only a few broad suggestions will be offered here.
The notion of shared management of international watercourse is not
new. Admittedly, the earlier institutional arrangements involving riparian
states for managing their common watercourses, including boundary rivers
and lakes, were mostly concerned with navigation and rarely dealt with
non-navigational uses. The earliest of these were the “river commissions,”
226. Unlike the Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria, the Conven-
tion on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika was not adopted under the East
African Community, as it includes state parties that are not members of the Community. The
two instruments entered into force in December 2004 and September 2005, respectively. The
Lake Tanganyika Authority is the implementing body of the Convention.
227. See Mission Report: Reactive Mission to Lake Malawi National Park, supra note
209; Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses, supra note 204.
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established for the Rhine228 and Danube229 in Europe in the early and
mid-nineteenth century. These were replicated in Africa more than a cen-
tury and a half later in the post-independence period: for example the Ni-
ger River Commission, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the
Organization for the Development of the Senegal River, established to
regulate the shared management and utilization of these watercourses for
both navigational and non-navigational uses.230 More recent arrangements
in Africa include those for Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika.231 The
Lake Victoria Basin Commission and Lake Tanganyika Authority are in-
tended to regulate and oversee collaborative and multilateral initiatives
for the management of these shared watercourses for both navigational
and non-navigational uses by the riparian states. As such, they may pro-
vide a template for a similar institutional mechanism for Lake Malawi.
Indeed, the FAO-initiated Draft Convention for the Sustainable Develop-
ment of Lake Malawi/Niassa/Niassa and its Basin provides for an institu-
tional framework composed of a commission (Articles 4 to 6); organs of
the commission comprising a council of ministers, a steering committee,
and standing committees (Articles 7 to 11); and a permanent secretariat
(Articles 15 and 16). As is common with these treaties and institutional
mechanisms, the objectives of the proposed commission are set out only in
broad terms. Thus, the proposed commission is intended to “[foster] coop-
eration among Contracting Parties, harmonize national measures for con-
servation, management, sustainable development and utilization of the
resources of the Lake and its Basin.” (Article 4(2)). Article 13 provides for
national consultations and coordination and exchange of information on
activities concerning the Lake and its basin. The activities envisaged in-
clude, but are not limited to, fisheries, scientific research, environment,
agriculture, forestry, water resources, planning, mining industry, develop-
ment, energy, tourism, and finance (Article 13(2)(a)).
All this is premised on the principles of equitable and reasonable utili-
zation and participation and the theory of limited territorial sovereignty
which, as noted earlier, underpin the modern law of international water-
courses. Article 19(1) encapsulates another principle of utmost importance
in the law of international watercourses: the obligation on contracting par-
ties to take appropriate measures “[when] utilizing the resources of the
228. The Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, established in 1816 fol-
lowing the adoption of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. For the background
context to the evolution of the Rhine River legal regime, see BE´LA VITANYI, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL REGIME OF RIVER NAVIGATION 50 (1979).
229. The European Commission of the Danube, established under the Treaty of Paris in
1856, 2 F. ISRAEL, MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1648–2000, 947–59 (2002).
230. See Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Origins and Development of International Fluvial Law
in Africa: A study of the international legal regimes of the Congo and Niger Rivers from 1885
to 1960, 29 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 368 (1982); Tiyanjana Maluwa, Legal Aspects of the Niger
River under the Niamey Treaties, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 671 (1988); Tiyanjana Maluwa, The
Development of International Fluvial Law in Post-Colonial West Africa: the Senegal Regime,
67 REVUE DE DROIT INT’L 1 (1989) (Fr.).
231. See Bootsma & Jorgensen, supra note 224.
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Lake and its Basin and other areas communicating with the Basin, in their
jurisdiction” to prevent causing significant environmental harm to other
parties. This is the well-known customary law principle of sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, so use your own property as not to injure your neigh-
bor’s.232 Article 19(2) also enjoins the parties to take into account the vital
economic, social, and cultural interests of other parties. Finally, Article 20
outlines a non-exhaustive list of areas and activities for which parties shall
be required to develop and harmonize their laws and policies for the con-
servation and sustainable utilization of the lake, its basin, and its ecosys-
tems, including the prevention of pollution and dumping of wastes into the
lake, and regulating the transportation of hazardous wastes by boat or
other water vessels. As noted earlier, both of these have been identified by
concerned local populations and the UNESCO World Heritage Commit-
tee as potential hazards from any activities that may be undertaken if
Malawi proceeds with its plans to prospect for and, possibly, extract gas
and oil in the lake, if available.
Other potential challenges of establishing an integrated approach to
the management of the resources of the lake and its basin have been the
subject of at least one study.233 Moreover, helpful comparisons may also
be drawn from a study and recommendations I have made elsewhere for
another international watercourse.234 It goes without saying that the exact
model for the multilateral management and utilization of the shared re-
sources of the lake would have to be worked out more in detailed arrange-
ments on a case by case basis, depending on the particular resource in
question, but within the framework of applicable international law. In this
respect, it is important that all the three riparian states, Malawi,
Mozambique, and Tanzania, as well as other states in the wider basin not
only be encouraged to ratify the Revised SADC Protocol and ensure its
expeditious entry into force, but that they also accede to the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
Both these treaties provide a sound basis on which concrete institutional
mechanisms and arrangements can be developed for implementing the
proposed collaborative, multilateral approach. Such concrete details
would include, inter alia, distribution of responsibilities, modalities for
sharing costs and benefits, equitable access to and use of resources, ac-
knowledgement of sovereignty and jurisdictional authority over the terri-
tory in which resources are located and, most crucially, an understanding
232. For one of the earliest expositions of this principle in the context of international
water law, see C. B. Bourne, The Right to Utilise the Waters of International Rivers, 3 CAN.
Y.B. INT’L L. 187 (1965).
233. See generally Tiyanjana Maluwa, Towards an Internationalization of the Zambezi
River Regime, 25 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 20 (1992), Alexander E. Bulirani, The Chal-
lenges of Developing an Integrated Approach to the Management of Lake Malawi/Niassa and
its Catchment Resources, in THE RAMSAR CONVENTION ON WETLANDS: LAKE MALAWI/
NIASSA/NYASA ECOREGION REPORT ON THE DONORS AND PARTNERS MEETING (Alaphia
Wright & Jonas Chafoa eds., 2003).
234. See generally Maluwa, Towards an Internationalization of the Zambezi River Re-
gime, supra note 233.
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that shared management and equitable and reasonable utilization do not
translate into co-ownership of the resources and joint sovereignty over the
territory in which those resources are located. Given that all the riparian
and basin states involved here are member states of the SADC, the institu-
tional mechanism and regulatory framework envisaged in the Revised
SADC Protocol offers the most obvious basis for the collaborative ap-
proach that I advocate in this essay.
IV. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE SADC MEDIATION PROCESS
This dispute, as with all disputes of this nature, is amenable to three
possible solutions: first, a political solution through diplomacy; second, a
legal solution through adjudication or arbitral settlement by a court or ar-
bitral tribunal; and third, a military solution, which is of course the most
extreme foreign policy instrument. It goes without saying that the choice
of the solution to be pursued is a prerogative of the states and political
elites or decision-makers in both countries, and not a choice to be made by
the local border populations. The decision is also usually a function of the
stakes involved in the conflict for the parties. The initiation of the SADC
mediation process was recognition of the absence of a judicial mechanism
in the regional body to deal with this kind of dispute. Yet, the process has
been beset with delays, controversy, and confusion. At the same time, at-
tempts at bilateral negotiations alongside the mediation have not fared
any better. Malawi has at various times appeared to question the integrity
of the mediation process, and on more than one occasion former President
Joyce Banda announced Malawi’s intention to refer the dispute to the
ICJ.235 Malawi also simultaneously sought the intervention of the AU236
and the U.N. Secretary-General in the matter.237
An incident in April 2013 best illustrates Malawi’s ambivalence to-
wards the mediation. Malawi dramatically announced its withdrawal from
the process, citing bias by a SADC official, John Tesha. According to the
Malawian authorities, Mr. Tesha, a Tanzanian national and the Executive
Secretary of the Forum for Former African Heads of State and Govern-
ment tasked with assisting the chief mediator, had forwarded Malawi’s
235. For example, at a meeting with mediators Joachim Chissano and Thabo Mbeki on
July 14, 2012, President Banda told them that Malawi would not accept an interim deal on
the dispute and reiterated her earlier position that if no resolution was reached by September
30, 2013, Malawi would take the matter to the ICJ. The deadline passed without Malawi
taking any action, and it was subsequently reported that the mediators had asked for a new
unspecified time frame to resolve the dispute. See Mabvuto Banda, JB warns she will take
lake dispute to ICJ, THE NATION (July 15, 2013), http://www.mwnation.com/jb-warns-she-
will-take-lake-dispute-to-icj/.
236. See, e.g., Malawi ‘refers lake border dispute with Tanzania to AU’, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19978968.
237. See Malawi asks UN to mediate border dispute with Tanzania, NYASA TIMES ON-
LINE (Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.nyasatimes.com/2012/10/13/malawi-asks-un-to-mediate-bor-
der-dispute-with-tanzania/.
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submission to the mediators prematurely to the Tanzanian government.238
Although Malawi was persuaded to return to the mediation barely a
month later, apparently following promises (which remain unfulfilled) of
Tesha’s recall by the Tanzanian government, there remains a certain de-
gree of skepticism, if not outright distrust, of the mediation process in
some quarters.239 I argue that from the outset, Malawi has been a some-
what reluctant party to the SADC mediation effort, and its hot-and-cold
reaction to the process since its inception reveals that Malawi’s preference
is for ultimate referral to the ICJ.
Yet recourse by Malawi to the ICJ is not a foregone conclusion. Both
Malawi and Tanzania are parties to the ICJ Statute by virtue of their ratifi-
cation of the U.N. Charter. States are free to refer disputes to the Court
without first exhausting diplomatic means of settling those disputes. But
the jurisdiction of the Court—whether in terms of ordinary jurisdiction by
the full bench of the Court or referral to a Chamber of the Court for arbi-
tration—is not automatic. Under Article 36(2) of the Statute, the so-called
Optional Clause, states may specifically declare that they recognize as
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any
other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court.240
Whereas Malawi made such a declaration on December 12, 1966,241
Tanzania has not made one. Thus, Malawi’s preferred route to judicial set-
tlement by the ICJ would first require it to persuade Tanzania to make a
special declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for
this matter and agree mutually to submit the dispute to the Court. This, in
turn, requires precisely the kind of diplomatic suasion and pressure that
Malawi is unable to exert upon Tanzania in the mediation process. It is by
no means obvious that Tanzania would accede to this demand. More cru-
cially, Malawi’s declaration is accompanied by the condition that it “shall
not apply to [disputes] in regard to which the parties of [sic] the dispute
have agreed to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settle-
238. John Tesha was assigned to assist the mediation team in his capacity as the execu-
tive secretary of the Forum. See Aditi Lalhbahadur, Malawi vs. Tanzania vs. SADC: Regional
dispute resolution bites the dust, S. AFR. INST. INT’L. AFF. (Aug. 13, 2013), http:/ /www.saiia
.org.za/opinion-analysis/malawi-vs-tanzania-sadc-regional-dispute-resolution-bites-the -dust/.
239. Such skepticism has been expressed particularly by some political analysts and
commentators in the Malawian media. The view expressed by one commentator, Cedrick
Ngalande, exemplifies this sentiment: “Malawi does not have much sympathy from former
freedom fighters in this region because of its support for the failed RENAMO [rebels in
Mozambique] and close relationship with the then apartheid South Africa. [Arbitration] by
leaders in this region between Malawi and any SADC country is therefore likely to be highly
skewed against us.” Gwinyayi Dzinesa, Concern over Malawi’s decision on arbitration, BUS.
DAY (Apr. 11, 2013, 7:04 A.M.), http:/ /www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanews/2013/04/11/con-
cern-over-malawis-decision-on-arbitration/.
240. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), http://www.icj-cij.org/docu-
ments/?p1=4&p2=2.
241. I.C.J., Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory:
Malawi (Dec. 12, 1966), http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3.
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ment.”242 Clearly, this reservation precludes the possibility of Malawi re-
ferring the matter to the ICJ while the mediation process is ongoing.
In agreeing to submit their dispute to a SADC-led mediation process,
the two parties to the dispute signaled their commitment to search for a
peaceful diplomatic solution. The difficulty for Malawi is that, although as
of this writing (June 2016) the mediation effort had clearly stalled for over
a year, neither party seems ready to break off the negotiations altogether
and take responsibility for the failure, nor do the mediators appear keen
to cut the Gordian knot and declare the mediation over.243 All the con-
cerned parties are no doubt sensitive to the fact that a failed mediation
would likely undermine the authority of SADC’s dispute resolution efforts
in the region, with the broader implication that a region that is unable to
manage its own disputes loses credibility in the eyes of the international
community. This could have ramifications for SADC’s authority to ad-
dress future interstate disputes among its members.244
Despite these pitfalls and isolated pronouncements by some political
leaders on both sides proclaiming their readiness to fight in defense of
their sovereignty, nobody seriously thinks that either party wishes to seek
a military solution to this dispute. President Joyce Banda’s reported deci-
sion to commission patrol boats for the lake in mid-2013 was, in my view,
more an empty gesture of saber-rattling aimed at impressing a domestic
audience than preparation for a real military confrontation.245 For one
242. Para. 2 of the declaration states:
Provided that this declaration shall not apply to: (i) disputes with regard to matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Republic of Malawi as
determined by the Government of Malawi; (ii) disputes in regard to which the
parties of [sic] the dispute shall agree to have recourse to some other method of
peaceful settlement; or (iii) disputes concerning any question relating to or arising
out of belligerent or military occupation. Id.
243. See Rex Chikoko, Mutharika rules out war with Tanzania over Lake Malawi, AFR.
REV. (Aug. 13, 2014, 9:29 AM), http://www.africareview.com/News/We-cannot-go-to-war-
with-Tanzania-over-lake/-/979180/2417530/-/ohjnxqz/-/index.html.
244. As it happens, the SADC Tribunal, the regional judicial body established in terms
of Article 9 of the SADC Treaty with a mandate, inter alia, to resolve disputes among mem-
ber states, was suspended in August 2010 by the SADC summit held in Windhoek, Namibia,
following representations by Zimbabwe that the tribunal was not properly established and, as
such, could not be legally recognized as an institution of SADC. The representations by
Zimbabwe came after the tribunal made decisions regarding the Zimbabwe Fast-Track Land
Reform Programme, which the Zimbabwean government did not agree with. The suspension
was extended indefinitely by the thirty-second SADC summit in Maputo, Mozambique, on
August 17, 2012. In the absence of the tribunal, there is no other regional court that could
conceivably adjudicate on the matter. At the moment, neither party has mooted the idea of
submitting the dispute to a formal arbitration if the mediation fails. Under these circum-
stances, recourse to the ICJ for a judicial settlement would be the only other option for a
peaceful settlement of the dispute.
245. Aislinn Laing, Arms firm link to charity that paid for PR costs of Malawi president’s
interview, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 28, 2013, 8:54 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/africaandindianocean/malawi/10482301/Arms-firm-link-to-charity-that-paid-PR-
costs-of-Malawi-presidents-interview.html.
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thing, according to a recent assessment by a leading external intelligence
agency, Malawi’s military capabilities appear to be no match for
Tanzania’s. The agency estimated Malawi’s military expenditure for 2012
at only 13.8 percent that of Tanzania, which in military terms makes
Malawi undoubtedly the quantitatively weaker of the two parties.246 Presi-
dent Peter Mutharika, who replaced Joyce Banda in May 2014, has
pledged to continue the search for a nonmilitary solution to the dispute
while reiterating Malawi’s position that its sovereignty over the lake is
nonnegotiable.247 Yet, it is clear that Malawi continues to be a reluctant
party to the mediation. Perhaps this reluctance can be explained in the
context of the observation that “[the] ‘voluntariness’ of mediation masks
the fact that mediated solutions offer imbalanced gains that generally ben-
efit stronger parties; [and] for a weaker party, a ‘voluntarily’ accepted so-
lution risks comparison to diplomatic brutalization by a powerful
neighbor.”248 For historical reasons that need not be discussed in any de-
tail here, there can be no doubt that Tanzania enjoys superior diplomatic
clout over Malawi within the SADC region because of its leadership posi-
tion in the founding of the subregional body. Moreover, the fact that the
three-person mediation team includes two former presidents (Joachim
Chissano and Thabo Mbeki) who have historically been politically closer
to Tanzania than to Malawi, because of the former’s role in and support
for the Mozambican and South African liberation struggles, leads the
Malawian political leadership to question their ability to act as honest and
impartial brokers in this mediation. This skepticism is shared by some po-
litical analysts and commentators.249
CONCLUSION
The examination of the historical evidence, treaties, and the applica-
ble law undertaken in this article leads to the conclusion that Malawi has
the better legal claim that would likely be vindicated by an impartial and
objective judicial authority. Malawi’s title rests on the provision of Article
I(2) of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890. Earlier suggestions by Tanzania
that the United Kingdom had unilaterally changed the boundary from the
median line to the eastern shoreline for the benefit of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland have been dismissed as factually incorrect and
dubious.250 The argument that the 1890 Agreement must be deemed to
have been impliedly amended as a result of inconsistences in the represen-
246. Tanzania’s and Malawi’s military spending for 2012 was USD $950 million and
USD $131 million, respectively. See U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WORLD
FACTBOOK (2012), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/20
34rank.html.
247. See Chikoko, supra note 243.
248. Lea Brilmayer, America: The World’s Mediator?, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS 57, 63 (Mary Ellen O’Connell ed., 2006).
249. See Dzinesa, supra note 239.
250. The claim was made by President Julius Nyerere in 1967. Mayall notes that the
claim was linked to some apparently inconsistent information in the United Kingdom’s AN-
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tations of the location of the boundary on some official and unofficial
maps and in textual descriptions in reports on both the British and Ger-
man sides has been rejected as untenable. As successor state to the United
Kingdom in the territory of the former Nyasaland protectorate, Malawi
has not relinquished its title over the disputed part of the lake in favor of
Tanzania. On the contrary, since their independence, both countries have
confirmed their recognition of the principle of respecting boundaries in-
herited at independence by endorsing the OAU’s Cairo resolution of 1964
and accepting the obligation enshrined in Article 4(b) of the AU Constitu-
tive Act, to which they are both parties. Unlike the resolution, which could
be characterized as lacking legally binding force, the Constitutive Act is a
binding treaty.
As argued in this essay, even if one accepts, as I do, that the decision
by the newly independent African states to accept the inviolability of the
boundaries inherited at independence as a “tangible political reality” was
a painful but necessary compromise that validated the application of ques-
tionable imperial international law and arguably illegitimate claims of title
to African territories, there is now a “tangible legal reality”: the sanctity of
colonial boundaries is a principle reaffirmed and encoded in a binding
multilateral treaty adopted by African states some four decades after inde-
pendence. Political expediency is not of itself enough reason for states to
withdraw from obligations voluntarily assumed under a treaty. While it is
true that uti possidetis does not preclude states from altering their borders
or creating new states, such territorial modifications can only be with the
mutual consent of the parties concerned. As I have argued above, respect
for the principle of uti possidetis need not mean the exclusion of negoti-
ated solutions that enable the shared management of borderland resources
for the mutual economic benefit of populations on both sides of the
border.251
Against the foregoing conclusion, Tanzania might argue that its pre-
sumed acceptance of uti possidetis has been vitiated by its contrarian con-
duct in depicting the boundary as following the median line, and not the
shoreline, of the lake on its maps. It might thus be suggested that the cur-
rent dispute differs in one significant respect from the cases discussed
above in which the ICJ and other international tribunals have held that
map evidence is not by itself conclusive to prove that a state has accepted
the territorial claims of its neighbor. However, it is noteworthy that
Tanzania’s campaign to depict the boundary differently on its maps has
not been consistent throughout its post-independence existence. Mention
was made earlier of the categorical statements by Prime Minister Julius
Nyerere, and later Prime Minister Rashid Kawawa, in the Legislative As-
sembly/Parliament, in the early years following Tanzania’s accession to
self-government and independence, confirming their acceptance of the
NUAL COLONIAL REPORTS for the period 1948–53, i.e. before the establishment of the Feder-
ation. See Mayall, supra note 3, at 623–24.
251. See generally the discussion in Part III supra: Competition Over Natural Resources
as a Root Cause of Border Disputes.
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shoreline boundary. Admittedly, as has been noted in this discussion, Ny-
erere later changed his position in 1967. A correct reading of the various
cases in which the issue of map evidence has come up for consideration
clearly suggests that the probative value of map evidence comes into play
in situations in which the text of a boundary treaty is unclear, inconsistent,
or ambiguous. In such cases, the map may be used as an additional inter-
pretative tool, but it cannot on its own be dispositive or determinative of
the dispute. In this case, Tanzania’s campaign to present the boundary dif-
ferently on its maps from the description in Article I(2) of the Anglo-
German Treaty of 1890, a treaty that remains binding on both Malawi and
Tanzania, as argued above, is nothing more than a unilateral attempt to
create new “cartographic facts” on the ground to void a treaty provision.
Given the trajectory of the jurisprudence of the ICJ in the many territorial
disputes that it has adjudicated, it is highly doubtful that this argument
would be received favorably by the Court.
Sumner has analyzed nine territorial disputes that have been brought
before the ICJ and examined the interplay and hierarchy among the most
common nine justifications in the outcomes of these cases to determine
which of them is dispositive or, at the minimum, determinative.252 He
identifies the nine justifications that have been invoked by claimants in
such disputes as: treaties, geography, economy, culture, effective control,
history, uti possidetis, elitism, and ideology.253 He concludes that the
court’s territorial dispute jurisprudence reveals “a tripartite, hierarchical
decision rule that looks first to treaty law, then to uti possidetis, and finally
to effective control.”254 In his reading, although territorial disputants pe-
rennially make arguments on various justifications, only these three have
operated consistently as the ICJ’s decision rule, and concludes that only
when a decision on any of these three grounds is impossible will the Court
resort to equity in deciding a case.255 In my view, all three of these justifi-
cations clearly favor Malawi. While one cannot rule out the possibility that
the ICJ could choose to use its authority under Article 38(2) of its Statute
to decide this dispute, if brought before it on equitable grounds,
Tanzania’s unilateral effort to depict the boundary differently on its maps
would certainly play no part in such considerations.
For the reasons explained above, Malawi appears confident that an
independent and impartial application of the law would favor its position.
Tanzania’s position, on the other hand, hints at its confidence in a
favorable outcome if the matter is resolved through diplomatic negotia-
tions and mediation. Currently, all indications are that Tanzania would
prefer to avoid submitting the matter to judicial settlement by the ICJ.
Gent and Shannon have posited that, among other factors, states are
endeared by judicial settlement (adjudication and arbitration) for three
252. See Sumner, supra note 179, at 1780.
253. Id. at 1782.
254. Id. at 1803–04.
255. Id. at 1811–12.
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reasons: first, it provides political cover; second, it can be more efficient;
and third, it placates domestic opposition to mediated outcomes. They also
argue that in a dispute over control of resources, such as this, the antici-
pated scale of revenue and foreign investment provides motivation for an
authoritative third-party ruling for the party more confident in its legal
position.256 Thus, the decision whether or not to proceed to judicial settle-
ment by the ICJ as opposed to staying with the mediation through the
SADC process depends on the respective parties’ assessment of their
chances of success or likelihood of an unfavorable outcome. The following
observation summarizes the situation aptly:
Malawi, the state that holds de facto control over the resources,
could be unwilling to risk the loss by giving up decision control.
On the other hand, Tanzania could be unwilling to forfeit its op-
portunity to gain some of those resources by submitting to a bind-
ing process. How the parties view their respective likely outcomes,
as well as their respective power comparative to one another, may
instruct their enthusiasm for controlled or uncontrolled
processes.257
This assessment is correct, and it highlights further the diplomatic
challenge that Malawi faces in pursuing its preferred option of taking the
dispute to the ICJ. Another factor that Malawi has to contend with is that
adjudication by the ICJ is a long process that could run into a number of
years. There is thus an inherent risk that the proposed oil and gas explora-
tions, for which concessions have already been granted, and other planned
economic activities could be delayed for an indeterminate time. Neverthe-
less, from Malawi’s perspective, the threat of an ICJ decision definitively
extinguishing Tanzania’s legal claim over the lake incentivizes Tanzania to
seek a negotiated solution that would ensure protection of the interests of
the local populations and the economic benefits from participation in the
exploitation of the maritime resources. Furthermore, the threat of contin-
uing exploration and possible exploitation of these resources prior to set-
tlement of the dispute also incentivizes Tanzania to continue with the
negotiations and avoid the temptation to use its superior military power to
resolve the dispute. Besides, given that Tanzania has the weaker legal case,
a view supported by almost all legal commentators who have written on
the matter, the best option open to it is to press on for a diplomatic or
political solution through mediation or direct negotiations with Malawi.
Yet, both options—preference for recourse to the ICJ for Malawi and
preference for continued mediation for Tanzania—are premised on the as-
256. Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding
Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, 55 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 710, passim
(2011).
257. CHRIS MAHONY ET AL., N.Z. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, POLICY AND PRAC-
TICE WHERE POLITICS BORDERS LAW: THE MALAWI-TANZANIA BOUNDARY DISPUTE 10
(2014); New Zealand Centre for Human Rights Law, Policy and Practice, Africa Working
Paper Series No. 21.
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sumption that the best outcome is one that satisfies the absolutist position
of either party. It is not impossible to imagine a solution, whether a judi-
cial settlement or a negotiated outcome, that would both reaffirm
Malawi’s territorial integrity and the sanctity of its international bounda-
ries and require both states to cooperate with each other on the joint man-
agement and exploitation of the resources in the disputed area of the lake.
This requires a shift from an approach that focuses on the imaginary line
that delineates the boundary between the two neighbors and the singular
and exclusive interests of the states to one that widens its gaze across bor-
derlands and the broader interests and livelihoods of the ordinary commu-
nities on both sides of the lake: a solution that turns the border from a
barrier into a bridge between the two communities. A recent informal
statement by a member of the mediation team seems to hint at some
thinking in this direction, at least on the part of the particular mediator.258
The best outcome for both Malawi and Tanzania is one that ensures that
the oil and gas resources under the troubled waters of Lake Malawi, if
they exist, should be a benefit, not a curse, for the peoples of both coun-
tries.259 Of course, given the history of the relations between the two
countries, it is also conceivable that if the mediation fails and neither party
258. During a visit by to Malawi Mr. Joachim Chissano and Mr. Festus Mogae on No-
vember 20, 2014 to brief President Mutharika on the status of the stalled mediation, Mr.
Mogae warned Malawi during a media conference that taking the matter to the ICJ is costly
and time-consuming. He shared Botswana’s experience of its own river boundary dispute
with Namibia which was adjudicated by the Court in 1996 (the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case).
He noted that although Botswana won the case, the Court ordered it to continue allowing
Namibians to carry out navigation, fishing, and tourism activities in the waters under its sov-
ereignty, which he said they had already been doing before they took the matter to the ICJ
and spent a lot of money on the litigation. The irony that it was under his presidency that
Botswana submitted the case to the Court after a failed mediation could not have been lost
on his audience. On his part, Mr. Chissano admitted that the mediation had stalled because
Malawi was going into its (May 2013) presidential and general elections, and that he could
not confirm when the process would resume. If this was indeed the reason for the stalling,
then it could take much longer before the mediation talks restart, given that Tanzania has its
own presidential and general elections coming up in late 2015. Meanwhile, President
Mutharika is reported to have reaffirmed his commitment to seeking a peaceful solution
while insisting that Malawi will not negotiate on its ownership of the lake. Frank Namangale,
Mediation Team Urges Patience from Malawi, Tanzania, THE NATION (Nov. 21, 2014), http://
mwnation.com/mediation-team-urges-patience-malawi-tanzania/.
259. On November 19, 2014, Malawi’s Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Min-
ing directed that “[all] companies involved in oil and gas exploration in Malawi immediately
cease all operations in relation to the granted oil and gas exploration licenses until the review
that is currently under way, regarding the manner and the procedures that were followed, is
finalized.” Hudson Mphande, Malawi Stops Oil, Gas Exploration; RakGas Gets Support,
NYASA TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nyasatimes.com/2014/11/20/malawi-stops-oil-gas-
exploration-rakgas-gets-support/. The government has pointed out that this does not signal
any move to abandon oil and gas exploration on the lake, but simply to verify that all explo-
ration concessions were granted in accordance with proper procedures and to ensure trans-
parency. At the time of this writing (June 2016), the suspension has not yet been lifted, and
all indications are that it will remain in place for a while longer. In the meantime, uncon-
firmed reports suggest that one or more of the concessions may be revoked for apparent
irregularities in the awarding process.
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takes the matter to the ICJ for judicial settlement, the boundary dispute
will be allowed to fester indefinitely, or at least for the foreseeable future,
without resolution. While this may not be the most desirable outcome,
consigning the dispute to the state of legal limbo in which it has been for
the better part of the last fifty years may be the most politically convenient
“solution” for both parties, until domestic pressures once again dictate
otherwise.
